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Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations 
Public policy governing data protection has followed an interesting trajectory in recent years, 
launched from being a niche regulatory subject into a mainstream concern for policy-makers, 
individuals  and  businesses.  The  emergence  of  an  information-rich  economy  for  which 
personal data are an important input explains the salience of data protection policy. Many 
commentators define digital confidence and trust as a key enabler of this information-rich 
economy.  EU  data  protection  regulation  has  a  role  to  play  in  the  enhancement  of  that 
confidence and trust. 
The first-generation data protection rules of 1995 are struggling to keep pace with market and 
technological  developments,  to  gain  acceptance,  and  ultimately  to  deliver  against  its 
objectives. Yet, reform of this area is one of the most ambitious legislative objectives that EU 
policy-makers  are  presently  grappling  with.  As  a  policy  issue,  data  protection  tends  to 
polarise opinion, for obvious reasons. EU policy-makers find themselves having to strike a 
balance between the various interests at stake: How to observe European fundamental rights 
without offsetting  the  demands  of  an  information-rich  economy  and  all  that  has  to offer 
consumers, businesses and the society at large? 
Issuing policy recommendations at the same time as the second-generation EU data protection 
legislation is in progress runs the risk of being judged against the politics of the moment. The 
scope  of  these  recommendations  is  more  ambitious  than  merely  informing  this  ongoing 
legislative process, however. Against the background of online personal data processing, the 
following policy recommendations address short- and mid-term policy goals and advocate a 
meta-governance approach to privacy and data protection. 
Policy recommendations  
Data protection  in the EU translates the protection of  fundamental rights  into sui generis 
rules. As currently proposed, the general data protection Regulation applies horizontally for 
most public and private processing of personal data.
1 
1.  In  scope,  the  new  regulation  is  technologically  neutral;  however,  the  regulatory 
division of  labour with  national  legislation pursuant to the e-privacy Directive and 
potentially other legislation needs to be further clarified. Some participants of the CEPS 
Digital Forum stressed that the relationship between the general regulation and the e-
privacy Directive should be addressed during the ongoing legislative process. 
2.  From the vantage point of online personal data processing, fragmentation persists along 
the  lines  of  the  e-privacy  Directive.  EU  data  protection  rules  that  apply  to  all 
information society and value-added services online should be consolidated and thereby 
unified within the regulation. 
                                                 
1 With the exception of the parallel initiative for a Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and in addition to certain 
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3.  Strengthening the tenets of risk-based regulation, information assurance and 
management, as well as consumer protection within data protection is a plausible 
strategy in response to the privacy and data protection challenges of the digital 
environment. 
4.  The regulation should be further consolidated with the aim to obtain a single and clear 
policy.  The  draft  legislation  should  be  edited,  using  plain  language,  and  reducing 
implicit concepts which really matter, e.g. transfer of personal data to third parties. 
In addition, any future regulation should strive to achieve the following concrete and short-
term policy aims: 
1.  Resolve the legal treatment of online identifiers so that it remains internally consistent 
with other provisions. 
2.  Ensure  consistency  in  the  event  that  definitions  of  controllers  and  processors  are 
adjusted so as to retain responsibility for the means of data processing. Introduce a 
rule whereby consumers cannot be the controller of their personal information that 
resides on third party equipment under a non-negotiable agreement with the service 
provider. 
3.  Strengthen  individuals’  consent  as  the  linchpin  for  quasi-market  mechanisms  in 
personal data transactions with a clear separation principle that prevents the bundling 
of  online  services  with  individuals’  consent  to  unrelated  additional  personal  data 
processing. 
4.  Clarify the concept of ‘legitimate interest’ as a legitimate basis for the processing of 
personal  data  as  well  as  defined  boundaries  in  order  to  offer  legal  certainty  to 
controllers and individuals alike. 
5.  In exercising the new ‘right to be forgotten’ controllers should not be left in charge to 
balance  conflicting  fundamental  rights,  i.e.  the  right  to  privacy  vs.  the  right  to 
freedom of expression, without further guidance. 
6.  Clarify the scope of the new ‘right to data portability’ and, where it is not otherwise 
legally permitted, require profiling to be a distinct purpose to which the data subject 
has to consent. 
7.  Enable  technologically  mediated  compliance,  e.g.  complying  with  documentation 
duties at the level of IT systems and management through automated IT compliance 
systems – in other words, the automated means of expressing consent and managing 
permission.  
8.  Consistently strengthen positive regulatory incentives  with the Regulation, using as 
leverage points: 
a.  Processing  of  personal  data  where  and  insofar  as  this  is  necessary  for  the 
performance of a contract to which the data subject is party, which should ideally 
incur only the minimum of administrative burdens; 
b.  Privileging the use of data protection-compliant technologies by controllers and 
recognising off-the-shelf compliance for those parts of data processing equipment 
and software that are sold or licensed to controllers; ONLINE PERSONAL DATA PROCESSING AND THE EU DATA PROTECTION REFORM  3 
 
c.  Enabling  EU-wide  compliance  schemes,  in  particular  for  SMEs,  (perhaps  with 
variations per industry or sector) and granting legal certainty as well as clarifying 
the role of codes of conduct in complying with data protection regulation. 
9.  Fully implement the one-stop-shop premise without undermining the mutual assistance 
and joint operations of national Data Protection Authorities (DPAs). The consistency 
mechanism needs more consolidation so as not to exceed its capacity or inflate the 
decision-making back-end.  
10.  Strengthen the capacity for reflexive governance at the level of national DPAs and the 
European Data Protection Board, e.g. defining enforcement priorities. 
11.  Regarding sanctions, enable DPAs to take into account commitments by controllers 
when imposing a fine. If SMEs are exempted from certain data protection requirements, 
in lieu of or complementary to a fine, reinstating the requirements to designate a Data 
Protection Officer (DPO) and documentation duties is a tactical remedy. 
12.  As a transparency measure, require member states to draw up a public repository of 
legal data processing obligations to which the controller is subject. 
Medium-term policy recommendations aimed at strengthening data protection as a field of 
public policy are addressed to the EU and the member states: 
1.  Fostering a culture of privacy and data protection should be firmly embedded in a 
meta-governance approach where member states and the EU co-operate at all levels 
and ensure the optimal attainment of both objectives through a variety of measures.  
a.  In consultation with member states, the EU should adopt a comprehensive strategy 
that addresses all participants in the public and the private sector according to their 
respective roles and responsibilities. 
b.  Data protection legislation is bound to become the centre-piece of EU policy, but its 
values should be reinforced at various levels and via other measures comprising 
public and private policies, technology and cultural measures. 
c.  Cultural impulses are indispensible to promote the values of privacy and data 
protection in the EU and beyond. Measures have to equally target data subjects, 
controllers, processors and professional groups and should, wherever possible, be 
integrated with other policy fields at EU and member state level. 
d.  In the area of fundamental rights EU and member state bodies should adhere to 
principles of procedural legitimacy, notably participation and transparency, and 
promote these principles vis-à-vis other stakeholders. 
e.  The EU and member states should continue to collect and showcase best practices in 
the public and private sector in an effort to exchange information and promote the 
uptake of innovative privacy and data protection solutions. 
2.  Measures  to  protect  privacy  and  data  protection  must  be  scalable  to  retain  their 
effectiveness in the information-rich economy. 
a.  Standardisation  and  Privacy-Enhancing  Technologies  (PETs)  in  middleware 
should become more central in the regulatory strategy, without mandating specific 
technologies, however. 4  IRION & LUCHETTA 
 
b.  EU-wide certification and compliance schemes that grant legal certainty need to 
be prioritised. 
c.  Policies should recognise the role of PETs for empowering individuals directly 
and promote them. 
As  privacy  and  data  protection  challenges  evolve,  EU  and  national  governments  should 
regularly review data protection policy implementation, continue to produce evidence and 
assess the need for (de)regulation where appropriate. 
 
  5 
Introduction 
Public policy governing data protection has followed a very interesting trajectory in recent 
years,  from  being  a  niche  regulatory  subject  to  a  mainstream  concern  for  policy-makers, 
individuals  and  businesses.  The  salience  of  data  protection  policy  can  be  linked  to  the 
emergence of a data-rich economy for which personal data act as an important input resource. 
Various accounts enthusiastically emphasise the economic growth and innovation potential 
associated with the use of personal data (BCG, 2012; WEF, 2011 and 2012). They underscore 
that public policy is an important vehicle to ensure the free circulation of personal data across 
organisations and frontiers. 
The European Union guarantees the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection. In 
order to give effect to both these fundamental rights, data protection legislation regulates what 
is legitimate processing of personal data and confers rights to individuals. The EU approach 
consists of  horizontal  and comprehensive regulation, which tempers some expectations of 
rendering personal data a commercial asset class without constraints imposed on its use. At 
the  same  time,  this  regulation  struggles  to  keep  pace  with  market  and  technological 
developments, to gain acceptance and ultimately to deliver against its objectives. 
The  opportunity  to  influence  public  policy  during  the  legislative  process of  the  EU  data 
protection  reform  has  allowed  for  much  controversy  and  politicised  debate,  which  has 
assumed a global dimension in the online environment. Policy-makers have to balance the 
opposing interests of companies and business on the one hand and of individuals on the other. 
Both sides, however, are bound by the elusive notion of trust which, although not a data 
protection  concept  itself,  is  understood  to  be  a  key  enabler  of  the  new  information-rich 
economy. Data protection policy can help to engender trust and confidence because it defines 
a framework of rights and responsibilities when using personal information. 
This  report  was  produced  by  the  Task  Force  on  Online  Personal  Data  Processing  in  the 
Context of the EU Data Protection Reform, an activity of the Digital Forum within the Centre 
for European Policy Studies (CEPS).
2 The purpose of the Task Force is to develop a dialogue 
among stakeholders, EU institutions, consumer and user representatives, internet advocacy 
groups and academics. This activity tackles  fundamental questions underlying the present 
dilemma  between  policy  objectives,  compliance  strategies  and  global  trends  in  online 
personal data processing. Between November 2012 and January 2013 the Task Force held 
four meetings devoted to the following topics: 
1.  The economics of privacy and the information economy 
2.  Compliance, risks and management 
3.  Old paradigms and new approaches to data protection regulation 
4.  (R)evolution: The EU data protection reform  
 
                                                 
2 It builds on CEPS’ expertise in the area of privacy; see inter alia Centre for European Policy Studies et al. 
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This report is the outcome of the Task Force and is based on a synthesis of the presentations 
and discussions at the meetings and the rapporteurs’ own research and analysis. 
The scope of the Task Force, and hence of this report, is  limited to online personal data 
processing in the private sector. The basis of this report is the EU approach to privacy and 
data protection,  i.e. the  fundamental rights approach, and  is  conscious that corresponding 
general regulation applies horizontally across public and private sectors. The report aims to 
assess compliance with data protection rules, particularly in the online environment, against 
the touchstone of effective regulation and public policy. As an outcome of the Task Force, the 
report aims at analysing underlying concepts and general principles, thereby deriving policy 
conclusions to make the EU data protection policy more fit for purpose and today’s online 
technological context. Please note that the outcome constructively engages with the EU data 
protection framework, but it does not deliver a textual analysis of the EU data protection 
reform proposal.  
This report is structured as follows: section 1 describes the emerging information economy 
with a view to the role of online personal data processing. Section 2 briefly introduces the 
fundamental  rights  to  privacy  and  data  protection  and  the  corresponding  EU  regulatory 
framework. Section 3 identifies relevant yardsticks against which it assesses data protection 
regulation, and introduces economic research that would explain some of the contemporary 
challenges to preserving privacy and data protection online. The next section discusses old 
paradigms and new approaches to data protection, unpacking regulatory key concepts and 
unresolved  issues  for  compliance.  From  a  public  policy  vantage  point, section  6  reviews 
proposals about how to modernise data protection radically or within the existing system. The 
last section turns to the EU data protection reform proposal  followed by conclusions and 
policy recommendations. 
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1.  The emerging information economy and online data processing 
On  a  global  scale  and  fuelled  by  an  unprecedented  ‘data  boom’,  economic  activities  are 
increasingly information-driven. The Boston Consulting Group estimated that the volume of 
global  data  transactions  increases  annually  by  45%,  which  implies  that  the  data  volume 
doubles every one and a half years.
3 The same study projects that the EU stands to gain €1 
trillion annually by 2020, or 8% of EU GDP, stemming from the information-driven economy 
(BCG,  2012,  p.3).  The  study  suggests  that  two-thirds  of  this  benefit  would  accrue  to 
consumers  and  one-third  to  public  and  private  organisations.  Forecasts  about  long-term 
efficiency gains and their distribution can be optimistic, yet the principle shift towards value 
creation that involves some form of information processing is sizeable. 
Against this backdrop, policy-makers and pundits proclaim the arrival of the information-rich 
economy (Acquisti, 2010a; Nissenbaum, 2011; Gervais, 2012). Personal data, likely to be the 
most important input, emerge as a new commercial asset class that is referred to as the “new 
oil”  of  the  information-rich  economy  (ENISA,  2011b,  pp.  26ff;  WEF,  2011  and  2012). 
According to Acquisti (2010a, p. 8),  
We live in a consumer data-driven and consumer data-focused commercial revolution in 
which individuals are at the same time consumers and producers of a most valuable asset: 
their personal information. 
Personal data, however, are not like any raw material that can be gained and exploited, but 
they relate to individuals and are a protected subject matter under the fundamental rights to 
privacy and data protection in the EU. This can create tensions between the market’s demands 
for personal data on the one hand and public policy and the rights of individuals on the other. 
The law of feasibility 
Technical  and  economic  constraints  on  the  processing  of  personal  data  have  almost 
disappeared (Brown, 2011): 
  Qualitative and quantitative leaps: what can be collected, analysed, searched, stored, 
retrieved, connected in a computerised online environment is radically different from 
the pre-ICT era (Kang, 1998; Lessig, 2006);  
  Costs of online data processing have plummeted: the price per unit of performance of 
processing power, sensors, bandwidth, and storage elements has gone down steeply 
(Brown, 2011) and will continue to do so (Yoo, 2011); 
Today’s socio-technological environment fosters the generation of more and more data, 
both personal and non-personal: 
                                                 
3 Social network services and the “Internet of Things” are two key drivers of the data expansion (BCG, 2012, p. 
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  Always-on  and  ubiquitous  internet  and  connected  (mobile)  devices  that  are  often 
personalised as well as the increasing interlinking of online and offline through geo-
location technology and localised services 
  Web 2.0 and the production and sharing of user-generated content, either publically 
or semi-publically 
  The internet of things and services that connects devices, sensors and applications 
produces a constant stream of information (RAND, 2008, p. 17). 
   Cloud  computing,  i.e.  access  to  remote  computing  resources  on  demand  and  the 
corresponding developments in cloud services. 
 
There are several ways in which online companies, in particular, derive economic value from 
personal information (Acquisti, 2010a; Brown, 2010; ENISA, 2011, pp. 26ff; Goldfard & 
Tucker, 2011; WEF, 2012; BCG, 2012): 
1.  Generating efficiencies in the allocation and/or production process 
2.  Creating new forms of interactions, personalised services and other value propositions 
3.  Targeting  advertising  or  geo-localised  services  to  help  match  supply  and  demand, 
thereby lowering advertising expenditure and/or increasing advertising effectiveness 
4.  Trading  and  sharing  personal  data  with  third  parties  and  across  networks,  thereby 
merging disparate data sets together 
5.  Generating  new  insights  about  individuals  through  profiling  and  from  exploiting 
advanced predictive analytics to large data sets (so-called “big data”) 
Private-sector participants and contributors to this Task Force formed a representative sample 
of companies engaged in the listed commercial activities. 
The  emerging  online  personal  data  ecosystem  is  complex  and  highly  interconnected  with 
large  intermediaries  at  its  centre,  which  essentially  aggregate,  process  and  distribute 
information, including personal information (see Appendix 1 in WEF, 2012, p. 32). Online 
business models vary and are constantly refined but they essentially generate revenues via 
fees charged to users, or advertisements or any combination thereof. A wide range of online 
services thrive from online and/or targeted advertising which may involve some degree of 
monetising users’ personal information.
4 Some Task Force contributors observed that many 
online services are not fully transparent about their data handling practices or can only be 
accessed on a  ‘take-it-or-leave-it’  basis where consumers  have to agree to extensive data 
processing operations by the website in exchange for a service.  
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Two developments that are likely to emerge hand in hand can stifle the transition to and 
growth of the information economy, as discussed below: 
On the one hand, both online and offline companies, which accumulated large data sets over 
time, are now very keen to exploit ‘their’ commercial asset. The attitude to claim a sort of 
ownership and control over corporate data, including the personal data of customers and other 
individuals, may not fully correspond with the roles, rights and responsibilities under the legal 
framework in the EU (ENISA, 2011b, pp. 26ff; WEF, 2012, p. 5). However, with commercial 
expectations running high – one Task Force contributor compared the phenomenon to the 
gold rush – data protection regulation and fair information practices are easily perceived as an 
obstacle. 
On the other  hand, consumers  and users  frequently  lack  assurance about the use of their 
personal information. Worries about privacy can negatively impact e-commerce and online 
services (Eurostat, 2009; for US see Pew, 2012). A vast majority of users are concerned by 
how their data are used (70% according to Eurobarometer, European Commission, 2011; 88% 
according to BCG, 2012, p.12). At the same time, awareness of data processing activities 
fluctuates; depending on the industry concerned, between 30% and 50%. These results are 
fairly  in  line  with  the  2011  Eurobarometer,  where  it  is  stated  that  about  75-80%  of 
respondents do not feel in control of the data they disclose online, and that the level of trust in 
internet  companies  is  very  low,  at  22%  (European  Commission,  2011).  Nevertheless, 
individuals are not generally inhibited from sharing personal data in a trusted relationship 
(Nissenbaum,  2010,  p.2).  In  online  transactions  this  can  be  achieved  by  demonstrating 
transparency  and  responsibility  in  addition  to  deploying  state-of-the-art  data  management 
techniques, all of which offer the potential of becoming a key market differentiator. 
The combined effect highlights the urgent need to consider public policy to fix the problem, 
with the aim of infusing the trust that is so central to the information economy. The EU is 
working to revamp its data protection rules of 1995 to set new rules that can deliver data 
protection, legal certainty and, ultimately, trust with the wider ambition to enhance the EU’s 
competitiveness and spur innovation and competition in privacy-savvy product and services 
(European Commission, 2012a; 2012b, Annex 10). Finding the right balance when protecting 
personal data through regulation will be crucial. Failure to establish a trusted flow of personal 
data under a firm but flexible regulatory framework could result in forfeiture of up to €440 
billion of gains (BCG, 2012, p.111). 
Moreover, data protection creates significant compliance costs, which almost all participants 
in  the  Task  Force  representing  larger  online  companies  underlined.  According  to  the 
European Commission’s impact assessment, the present EU framework for data protection 
imposes on European companies a total of €5.3 billion of administrative burdens.
5 Another 
                                                 
5 The impact assessment entails only a partial cost-benefit analysis; therefore the overall burden is likely to be 
even higher. For example, costs related to obtaining consent from users seem to have escaped quantification. See 
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source reports that very large companies (with more than 1,000 employees) spend up to €2.5 
million  per  year  in  privacy  compliance  costs  (Ponemon  Institute,  2011).  Overcoming  the 
fragmentation of data protection regulation within the EU alone promises to cut an estimated 
€1.6  billion  from  the  €5.3  billion  administrative  burden  for  companies  doing  business  in 
Europe (European Commission, 2012b, Annex 9). 
Last but not least, the EU is also spearheading the protection of personal data worldwide and, 
especially in a globe-spanning medium such as the internet, the EU approach is criticised for 
being overly ambitious. Considerations about the EU’s global competitiveness are necessary, 
but positions tend to reflect different philosophies on the virtues of data protection. One end 
of the spectrum would argue for strong data protection in the EU that could infuse confidence 
in EU businesses, also from outside the region. At the other end of the spectrum, it is argued 
that data protection should not obstruct online businesses but rather provide for the global 
flow of personal data (WEF, 2012, p. 29). These positions are not mutually exclusive, but 
where  the  regulatory  pin  is  placed  depends  in  part  on  a  contemporary  interpretation  of 
fundamental rights, which is also partly a political decision. 
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2.  EU data protection rights and regulation 
2.1  Fundamental rights to privacy and data protection 
This report necessarily begins by invoking the fundamental rights that underpin the approach 
to privacy and data protection in the European Union, because this ultimately impacts the 
regulatory  level.  Relevant  sources  that  serve  to  protect  the  rights  to  privacy  and  data 
protection  are  the  national  constitutional  heritage  of  EU  countries,  EU  primary  law  and 
international human rights law. 
2.1.1  EU member states 
The right to privacy is recognised in most constitutions of EU member states, and where this 
is not explicitly the case (e.g. in Germany, France and Sweden), its substance is derived from 
other constitutional guarantees, such as the right to human dignity but also liberty. Although 
the  wording  and  the  construction  vary  from  country  to  country,  the  right  to  privacy  – 
explicitly or implicitly – forms part of the common constitutional heritage of all EU member 
states (Koops et al., 2007, p.152). 
With  a  few  exceptions (e.g. the Netherlands and Sweden), the right to data protection  is 
commonly not recognised in EU member states’ constitutions. Nonetheless, the right to data 
protection can be derived from the national constitutional heritage of most EU countries as an 
extension of the right to privacy (FRA, 2010, p.14; Koops et al., 2007, p.153).  
2.1.2  EU primary law 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) of the European Union of 2000 provides in its Art. 
7 for the right to respect for private and family life. 
Art. 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
Respect for private and family life 
Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications. 
With the enactment of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU in 2000, the right to data 
protection is now listed as a self-standing fundamental right (Art. 8) after the right to privacy 
in the catalogue of freedoms of the individual. Art. 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) incorporates the Charter into EU primary law, and the European Court of Justice of the 
EU now refers to data protection as a fundamental right (CJEU, Promusicae, 2008). 
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Art. 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
Protection of personal data 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, 
and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority. 
Interestingly, Art. 8(2) CFR elevates a fair number of core data protection concepts into the 
EU fundamental rights acquis (Centre for European Policy Studies et al., 2011, p. 20). It 
carries  some  of  the  regulatory  substance  that  circumscribes  requirements  for  lawful  data 
processing (e.g. fairness, purpose specification, consent, etc.), as well as certain rights for the 
individuals concerned and independent supervision of “these rules”. Art. 8(2) CFR provides 
that any processing of personal data must be legitimate on the basis of either the concerned 
individual’s consent or law. Hence, the new right to data protection also protects against the 
processing of personal data where there is no legitimate basis. 
The  CJEU  also  maintains  that  the  right  to  data  protection  is  not  absolute,  “but  must  be 
considered  in relation to its  function  in society” (CJEU, Volker und Markus Schecke and 
Eifert, 2010). Whenever the processing of personal data has its legitimate basis in a law, Art. 
52(1) CFR must be complied with. It provides that, subject to the principle of proportionality, 
limitations to the exercise of this right may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely 
meet objectives of general interest recognised by the EU or the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others (Art. 52(1) CFR). 
Moreover, EU primary law holds a second reference to the right to the protection of personal 
data in Art. 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Another 
novelty is Art. 16(2) TFEU, which equips the EU with the distinct competence to adopt data 
protection regulation, including “the rules relating to the free movement of such data”. 
2.1.3  International human rights law 
From the body of international human rights law, only the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) is revisited because it reinforces the trend to regulated data protection.
6All EU 
member states are signatories of the ECHR and the EU is committed to accede to it (Art. 6(2) 
TEU). Art. 8(1) ECHR provides for the right to respect for private and family life, among 
others. In order to be justified, any interference with this right by a public authority must be in 
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accordance  with  the  law  and  necessary  in  a  democratic  society  in  pursuit  of  one  of  the 
interests enumerated in Art. 8(2) ECHR. 
In the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Art. 8 ECHR entails a 
positive obligation of the signatory states to introduce measures that would give effect to the 
right  for  respect  of  private  life,  including  in  the  private  sphere  (ECtHR,  X  and  Y  v 
Netherlands, judgement of 26 March 1985, para. 23). Moreover, the Court has interpreted 
Art. 8 ECHR as encompassing data protection rules from the Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals  with  regard  to  Automatic  Processing  of  Personal  Data.
7  Convention  108 
introduced a system of data protection regulation that  is systematically similar to the EU 
regulatory framework on data protection. 
It is important to note that, outside Europe, constitutional traditions and international human 
rights law recognise the right to privacy, but in their respective contexts cannot be interpreted 
to require a comprehensive data protection approach. Nonetheless, third countries maintain 
and continue to adopt data protection laws (see Rule & Greenleaf, 2010; Koops et al., 2007).  
2.1.4  The constitutionalisation of the right to data protection 
With the advent of automated and computerised data processing, the right to privacy now 
rests  to  a  considerable  extent  on  effective  data  protection.  The  right  to the  protection  of 
personal  data  has  evolved  from  a  regulatory  strategy  to  guarantee  privacy  to  a  modern 
fundamental right in the EU. This constitutionalisation has certainly entrenched the right to 
the protection of personal data further. Purtova (2012, p. 223) thus rightly observes that “it is 
no longer possible to avoid human rights issues when discussing data protection matters”. 
After the Lisbon treaties, EU primary law now furnishes two legal bases for the new right to 
data protection (Art. 6(1) TEU in connection with Art. 8 ECFR and Art. 16(1) TFEU) as well 
as a new EU competence to legislate this area (Art. 16(2) TFEU). Like the right to privacy, 
the right to data protection can be subject to restrictions as long as the restriction constitutes a 
necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a democratic society to safeguard 
important  general  interest  objectives.  Moreover,  the  rights  to  privacy  and  personal  data 
protection need to be reconciled with other fundamental rights, such as the right to freedom of 
expression, by balancing competing rights against each other (FRA, 2012).  
The following section introduces the EU regulatory framework on personal data protection, 
portions of which actually pre-date the Charter’s right and largely inspired it.
8 
                                                 
7 Court of Europe, European Treaty Series, No. 108, commonly referred to as Convention 108. 
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2.2  EU framework on personal data protection 
The EU regulatory framework on data protection comprises several instruments that address 
different  EU  policy  domains.  However,  for  this  report,  which  is  concerned  with  online 
personal  data  processing  in  the  private  sector,  the  focus  is  on  legislation  that  aims  at 
establishing  an  internal  market,  that  is,  legislation  falling  within  the  former  first  (or 
Community)  pillar.  Privacy  and  data-protection  policies  in  the  EU’s  Area  of  Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ) fall outside the scope of this report.
9 
It is important to note that the first edition of an EU data protection framework under the 
former first pillar did not emerge from the void. The 1995 Directive builds conceptually on 
two international standard-setting instruments: the non-binding 1980 OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data and the Council of Europe 
(CoE) Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data from 1981. Both instruments endorse a set of principles intended to narrow the 
scope  of  legitimate  personal  data  processing  and  to  introduce  procedural  legitimacy  and 
accountability. 
The  core  instrument  is  Directive  95/46/EC  of  24  October  1995  on  the  protection  of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (hereinafter, the data protection Directive). Other sector-specific harmonisation directives 
complement  the  general  data  protection  Directive.  In  the  context of  this  report, the  most 
significant  is  Directive  2002/58/EC  concerning  the  processing  of  personal  data  and  the 
protection of privacy in the electronic communications (hereinafter, the e-privacy Directive). 
Finally, there  is a plethora of  legislation at both the EU and the  member state level that 
mandates data processing for public and private organisations. Within the EU data protection 
framework, such legislation provides a legitimate basis if it meets constitutional requirements. 
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Figure 1. EU data protection framework pertaining to online data processing 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
The following carries a highly condensed summary of the main data protection instruments in 
the EU that govern online personal data processing activities in the private sector. 
2.2.1  The data protection Directive 
The data protection Directive harmonises member states’ national laws (to a certain extent) 
with the dual aim to: 
1.  protect the fundamental right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data, 
and 
2.  provide for the free flow of personal data between EU member states (Art. 1). 
This  dual  ambition  exposes  the  regulation  to  a fair  amount  of  internal  tension  whenever 
personal data protection and personal data flows cannot be achieved simultaneously. 
The  Directive  applies  horizontally  across  public  and  private  sectors’  automated  or 
systematised personal data processing activities. The regulatory approach is in compliance 
with a priori and comprehensive regulation. ‘Personal data’ and the ‘data subject’s consent’ 
are  key  definitions  of  the  Directive  (Art.  2),  which  are  decisive  for  its  application.  The 
Directive operates with different roles, i.e. the data subject, the controller, the processor and 
the recipient, to which different rights and responsibilities are attached. Conceptually, the data 
protection Directive endorses five principles (Art. 6, see box below) and six alternative legal 
grounds  that  render  data  processing  legitimate  (Art.  7),  out  of  which  the  data  subject’s 
unambiguous consent to the data processing is just one possibility. 16  IRION & LUCHETTA 
 
Art. 6 of the data protection Directive 
1. Member States shall provide that personal data must be: 
(a)  processed fairly and lawfully; 
(b)  collected  for  specified,  explicit  and  legitimate  purposes  and  not  further 
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. […]; 
(c)  adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they 
are collected and/or further processed; 
(d)  accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; […]; 
(e)  kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is 
necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they 
are further processed. […]. 
2. It shall be for the controller to ensure that paragraph 1 is complied with. 
The processing of special categories of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions,  religious  or  philosophical  beliefs,  trade-union  membership,  and  data  concerning 
health or sex life is prohibited (Art. 6(1)) unless derogations apply (Art. 6(2)). 
Aside from the ability to legitimise most data processing with an unambiguous consent, data 
subjects have several rights in relation to their data, such as the rather comprehensive rights of 
access (Art. 12) concerning all matters of personal data processing and which can further 
extend to demand rectification, erasure or blocking of personal data; or the right to object 
(Art. 14), which can pre-empt certain  legitimate bases  for data processing and the use of 
personal data in direct marketing. 
Controllers are responsible for adhering to the data protection principles (Arts 6(2)) and rules, 
including  certain  information  duties  (Arts  10  and  11),  being  responsive  to  data  subjects’ 
rights, and ensuring the security of the processing (Art. 17), as well as being liable for any 
damages and supervised by the competent data protection authorities (DPAs). Processors are 
auxiliaries  under  the  authority  of  the  controller  which  receive  instructions  on  the  data 
processing (Art. 17(3)). 
Transfer of personal data from the EU to a third country is only permissible if an adequate 
level  of  personal  data  protection  is  ensured  in  that  third  country.  Finally,  the  Directive 
mandates  that  member  states  entrust  independent  authorities  with  the  monitoring  and 
enforcement of the data protection regulation (Art. 28(1)). 
As secondary EU legislation, the Directive is addressed to the member states and does not 
produce direct effects for individuals and companies. Every member state transposed the data 
protection Directive into national law and this framework has been operating for almost 15 
years  now.  However,  national  variations  in  terms  of  implementation,  interpretation  and 
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With the aim to modernise data protection in the EU, a draft proposal for a new general data 
protection  Regulation  is  currently  going  through  the  legislative  process  (European 
Commission, 2012a). If passed it would replace the current data protection Directive with the 
new Regulation, the hallmarks of which are discussed in section 6 below. 
2.2.2  The e-privacy Directive 
The  2002  e-privacy  Directive,  as  amended  by  Directive  2009/136/EC,  forms  part  of  the 
regulatory framework for electronic communications. The Directive spells out the rights of 
users and subscribers,  including  legal persons, of electronic  communications  services and 
protects the confidentiality of communications, while ensuring the free movement of personal 
data within the EU. The e-privacy Directive makes reference to central notions of the data 
protection Directive, for example the definition of consent. 
The  economic  significance  of  the  e-privacy  Directive  is  mounting  steadily  due  the  shift 
towards digital services. This effect can be best observed in three areas: 
-  The processing of traffic and location data, 
-  Unsolicited commercial electronic communications and 
-  The storing of  information and  access to information already  stored  in the terminal 
equipment of a subscriber or user (the so-called ‘cookie rule’). 
The three examples of the regulatory effect of the e-privacy Directive are explained below. 
The  e-privacy  Directive  governs  traffic  data  and  location  data  (Arts  6  and  9),  which  are 
increasingly  in  demand  and  processed  by  electronic  communications  providers  and  third 
parties. As an illustration, mobile apps frequently involve location data when offering geo-
localised services, such as maps and local information. Under the scope of the Directive, the 
provision of value-added services requires the processing of additional traffic data or location 
data (Art. 2(g)), which is legitimate when the concerned user or subscriber has given his or 
her consent. 
Art. 13 of the e-privacy Directive imposes limitations on unsolicited commercial electronic 
communications, namely direct marketing via automatic calling systems, fax and email. Here 
an exception that produces an effect beyond the sector-specific scope of the Directive allows 
the use of  email  for direct marketing  in the context of an existing customer relationship. 
However, in order to benefit from this exception, the customer’s email address must have 
been obtained in accordance with the general data protection Directive. 
The introduction of the so-called ‘cookie rule’ in 2009 (Art. 5(3)) is an attempt to come to 
terms with the increasing practice to store or access already stored information on the user’s 
or  subscriber’s  communications  device  for  a  variety  of  purposes.  These  are  often  called 
‘HTTP cookies’, but the new rule is technologically neutral. This practice is “only allowed on 18  IRION & LUCHETTA 
 
condition that the subscriber or user concerned has given his or her consent, having been 
provided with clear and comprehensive information, in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, 
inter alia about the purposes of the processing.” (Art. 5(3)) As an exemption from this rule, 
cookies  are  permissible  if  they  are  technically  required  in  the  process  of  electronic 
communications or in order to carry out an information society service explicitly requested by 
the subscriber or user (WP29, 2012, p.2). 
All  three  examples  described  above  have  in  common  that  they  concern  most  online 
transactions and offerings of content and services, for free or against remuneration, to the 
effect that the e-privacy Directive develops into a mainstream data protection instrument. 
The e-privacy Directive is not concerned by the ongoing data protection reform. As it stands, 
only technical adjustments are planned to take into account the transformation of the data 
protection  Directive  into  a  regulation  and  to  clarify  the  relationship  between  the  two 
instruments (see the Draft for a general data protection Regulation, Recital (135)). 
2.2.3  Other legal obligation that mandates the processing of personal data from the 
controller 
Apart from the positive regulation of data protection, an ever-increasing body of legislation at 
both the EU and the member state levels authorises, requires or obliges the processing and 
storage of personal data. Examples are record-keeping obligations, such as those contained in 
national tax and social security laws. Under the EU regulatory framework for data protection, 
these laws actually provide a legitimate basis for data processing (data protection Directive, 
Art. 7(c)). Because such statutory plug-ins to data protection interfere with the exercise of 
fundamental rights, the interference must be justifiable (Art. 8(2) ECHR and Art. 52(1) CFR). 
This link between specific laws and data protection regulation is not always well explored 
and, arguably, there may be legislation in the member states and the EU that does not meet  
the threshold for justification (ENISA, 2012b, p. 48). 
An  area  that  is  experiencing  a  proliferation  of  new  obligations  is  government  access  to 
private-sector  data  for  the  purpose  of  national  security  and  law  enforcement  (Centre  for 
European Policy Studies et al., 2011 p. 15). Central to this report is Directive 2006/24/EC on 
the retention of data generated or processed  in  connection with the provision of publicly 
available  electronic  communications  services  or  of  public  communications  networks 
(hereinafter,  the  data  retention  Directive).  This  Directive,  which  amends  the  e-privacy 
Directive, aims at harmonising  member state provisions concerning the obligations of the 
aforementioned  providers  to  retain  certain  data  in  order to  ensure  its  availability  for  law 
enforcement purposes (Art. 1(1)). 
The data retention Directive defines types of data to be retained between six months and up to 
two years, depending on the national transpositions in the member states. Data retention is 
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actual content of electronic communication (Arts 1(2) and 5). This Directive leaves it actually 
to the member states to define a catalogue of serious crimes for the investigation, detection 
and prosecution of which the retained data can be accessed by the competent authorities (Art. 
1(1)). Thus, the harmonisation stops short of the legal requirements under which the data can 
be accessed. 
2.3  Supervisory authorities in the EU 
Supervision and enforcement are key features in assessing the functioning of the EU data 
protection framework. While much attention is focused on the required independence of the 
competent supervisory authority (Art. 8(3) CFR; CJEU, European Commission v. Germany, 
2010; and CJEU, European Commission v. Republic of Austria, 2012), this section explores 
the distribution of competences at national level and EU level. 
2.3.1  National supervisory authorities 
EU  data  protection  regulation  mandates  supervision  and  enforcement  by  independent 
supervisory  authorities,  so-called  national  DPAs  (data  protection  Directive,  Art.  28(1)). 
Member states have to designate one or more public authorities to monitor the application of 
national  legislation pursuant  to the  data  protection  Directive  and  the  e-privacy  Directive. 
Thus, local arrangements tend to reflect national administrative and governmental cultures as 
well as divisions of competences according to sectors. 
In the majority of member states, the competencies for general data protection regulation and 
pursuant to the e-privacy Directive are divided between different authorities. On the one hand, 
there are one or more national DPAs (this may be in federal or regional-configured states, 
such as Germany and Spain, further distributed to regional and state DPAs) in charge of data 
protection in the private sector. On the other hand, sector-specific DPAs, such as the National 
Regulatory Authority (NRA) for the electronic communications sector, which are in charge of 
enforcing the e-privacy Directive (e.g. in Germany and the Netherlands) (FRA, 2010, p. 19). 
Often,  data  protection  competence  is  embodied  in  a  personalised  authority  such  as  a 
Commissioner for Data Protection (e.g. in Germany or in Hungary) or an Ombudsman (e.g. 
Finland) supported by staff. 
2.3.2  Responsibilities for data protection at the EU level 
For  EU  institutions,  the  European  Data  Protection  Supervisor  (EDPS)  is  an  independent 
supervisory authority charged with supervising the EU institutions’ and bodies’ adherence to 
their own set of data protection rules, i.e. Regulation (EC) 45/2001. EDPS is not involved in 
enforcing generally applicable data protection regulation but has an important advisory role 
on EU policies and legislation that affect privacy. In this capacity, the EDPS also participates 
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The so-called Article 29 Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data (hereafter WP29) is an EU-wide advisory body that is composed 
of a representative of each member state’s DPA(s), the EDPS, and the European Commission 
(data protection Directive, Art. 29(1) and (2)). Its main tasks are to contribute to the uniform 
application of national measures by: 
-  examining  the  national  application  of  legislation  pursuant  to  EU  data  protection 
regulation,  
-  issuing  opinions  and  recommendations  on  the  interpretation  of  core  notions  in  data 
protection regulation and 
-  enhancing cooperation between national DPAs in the interest of joint procedures and 
enforcement actions (data protection Directive, Art. 30; e-privacy Directive, Art. 15). 
Although WP29 has stepped up its activities, which aim to streamline the application of the 
national  laws  pursuant  to  EU  directives,  the  results  of  its  endeavours  are  not  deemed 
sufficient  to  effectively  deal  with  intra-European  data  transfers.  Furthermore,  the  Kantor 
study criticises legal fragmentation and the fact that WP29 consistency mechanisms cannot be 
authoritatively imposed at the domestic level (Kantor Ltd., 2010, para. 92). 
Additionally, two specialised EU agencies should be mentioned that have non-operational 
competencies  in  relation  to  data  protection:  first,  the  Fundamental  Rights  Agency  (FRA) 
provides  EU  institutions  and  bodies,  as  well  as  EU  member  states  when  implementing 
European  law,  with  assistance  and  expertise  relating  to  fundamental  rights.
10  Second, the 
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) is a centre of expertise which 
studies  the  intersection  of  privacy  and  data  protection  with  information  technology  and 
security as well as economics.
11 
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3.  An assessment of EU data protection policy 
This report aims to assess EU policy and regulation of online personal data protection and 
thus needs to adopt an analytical angle against which the existing concepts and the reform 
proposals can be probed. Despite a significant body of research pointing to the numerous 
shortcomings of today’s regulation and practice, this section first clarifies what are the right 
yardsticks for assessing the EU data protection framework (Baldwin et al., 2012, p.25) and 
subsequently reviews arguments on what makes good regulation. 
3.1  What are the right benchmarks for assessing EU data protection regulation? 
Given numerous, but rather confusing, accounts of what data protection is and is expected to 
deliver, understanding the purpose and  motivation of its regulation becomes an  important 
intermediary step. The following paragraphs provide arguments that exclude data protection 
from these regulatory regimes and adopt a fundamental rights approach. 
Data protection is not: 
  economic regulation, 
  consumer protection regulation, 
  immaterial property rights, 
  risk-based regulation, 
  information assurance or management or 
  risk-based regulation. 
 
  Not economic regulation 
Despite a recent trend to analyse the economics of privacy and data protection (see section 3.3 
below), data protection regulation is not economic regulation (Acquisti, 2010a, p.3; ENISA, 
2012a, p.1). Economic regulation is characterised by a direct intervention in market decisions, 
such as pricing, competition, market entry or exit, and this is mostly justified by the aim to 
correct market failure (Veljanovki, 2010, p.20). In contrast, the data protection Directive takes 
a horizontal approach and addresses equally data processing activities in both the public and 
private  sectors,  as  well  as  market  and  non-market  activities.  Although  there  are  a  few 
propositions that explain  market failure  in the context of privacy and data protection, the 
expressive ambit of EU data protection regulation is the protection of the fundamental rights 
to privacy and data protection. Hence, as a regulatory sphere, data protection does not have to 
satisfy allocative efficiency in the strict economic sense. However, it should not overlook the 
economic  implications  that  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  the  regulation  (see  section  3.3.5 
below). 
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  Not consumer protection 
Data protection is also not consumer protection, which refers to a cross-cutting EU policy 
field that aims at enhancing the positions of consumers and end-users of products and services 
(Art.  169  TFEU).  Insofar  as  consumer  protection  regulation  modifies  contract  law  to the 
benefit of the consumer (e.g. regarding unfair terms and practices), it departs from the ‘party 
autonomy’ principle. Conversely, data protection regulation strongly emphasises the control 
and autonomy of the individual when it allows his or her consent to legitimise the processing 
of personal data (WP29, 2011, p. 8). The notion that the interest of data subjects deserves 
special protection can nevertheless be found in a number of provisions in the data protection 
Directive (Art. 7(d) and (f)) – a trend that is likely to be reinforced with the data protection 
reform (European Commission, 2012a; RAND, 2009, p.30). 
  Not property rights 
As such, personal data does not confer any property right that would then protect the subject 
matter  vis-à-vis  other  parties  (the  so-called  erga  omnes  effect)  (Lynskey,  2013;  Purtova, 
2012, p. 80 and p. 250). Public and private stakeholders  continue to invoke ‘information 
‘ownership’ which may wrongly imply some generic proprietary right (Reed, 2010; WEF, 
2011). Property rights subsist in chattels on which data may be recorded (e.g. sheets of paper, 
disks,  pen  drives,  etc.)  but  not  in  the  information  itself.  Admittedly,  information  can 
sometimes be subject to intellectual property protection, such as copyright, but this does not 
subsume  personal  data  in  general.  Data  protection  is sui  generis  regulation  that  does  not 
replicate concepts of property protection. Using ‘propertisation’ as a strategy to introduce a 
market mechanism for personal data is discussed in more detail in section 5.1 below. 
  Not information assurance or management 
The protection of personal data cannot be fully explained in terms of information assurance or 
management,  which  is  a  practice  of  managing  ICT-related  risks  in  order  to  ensure 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. First and foremost, EU data protection regulation 
establishes  that  personal  data  must  be  processed  fairly  and  lawfully  and  compatibly  with 
specified,  explicit  and  legitimate  purposes  (data  protection  Directive,  Art.  6(1)(a)  and 
(b)).Only insofar as the data processing is already legitimate does the data controller have to 
ensure the accuracy, confidentiality and security (data protection Directive, Arts 6(1)(d), 16 
and 17(1)). Thus, information assurance and management duties arise under data protection 
regulation as an obligation placed on the data controller, e.g. the state-of-the-art principle 
according to which data controllers shall “ensure a level of security appropriate to the risks 
represented by the processing and the nature of the data to be protected” (Art. 17(1) of the 
data protection Directive). 
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  Not risk-based regulation 
In general risk-based regulation seeks “to control relevant risks, not to secure compliance with 
sets of rules” (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 281). However, a purely risk-based approach would not 
suffice to protect the right to privacy and data protection because it would presuppose the 
legality of data processing activities regardless of individuals’ fundamental rights to privacy 
and data protection. Data protection regulation already borrows from risk-based regulation, 
e.g. special categories of personal data receive a higher level of protection because of the 
‘riskiness’ of processing sensitive information (Art. 8 of the data protection Directive). 
Risk-based regulation entered the discussion surrounding the legislative process of the draft 
general data protection Directive. Accordingly, more emphasis should be given to a gradual 
regulatory  approach  under  which  controllers’  obligations  would  step  up  relative  to  the 
riskiness of the processing operation in question. This solution has the charm that with the 
increasing sophistication of the processing of personal data, controllers can also be expected 
to take more advanced steps to ensure compliance with data protection regulation. How to 
create meaningful thresholds for risk-based regulation in this area could be more controversial 
because  many  of  the  regulatory  requirements  are  interdependent  (e.g.  the  controller  has 
interrelated responsibilities of notification, documentation and accountability). 
  But fundamental rights approach 
Data protection in the EU translates the protection of fundamental rights into sui generis rules 
(Kantor, 2010, para. 26; RAND, 2009, p.27) while invoking supporting elements from other 
regulatory regimes. The regulatory literature acknowledges a rights-based and public interest 
rationale for regulation (Baldwin et al., 2012, p.22; Feintuck, 2010).Consequently, this Task 
Force took a fundamental rights-based approach when appraising data protection regulation’s 
functioning  and  impact  (CEPS  Digital  Forum,  2012)  but  against  this  backdrop  considers 
supporting measures, such as a meta-governance approach to privacy and data protection. 
As is the case with most sui generis regimes, however, little specific guidance can be deduced 
from regulatory experiences elsewhere. However, when assessing the performance of EU data 
protection regulation, wrong assessment benchmarks should be refused. In other words, data 
protection regulation does not need to perform solely against efficiency criteria that guide 
economic  regulation  or  measures  that  are  commensurate  with  the  risk,  as  in  risk-based 
regulation. 
3.2  Is data protection meeting good regulation standards? 
Nonetheless, universal standards on what makes good regulation “have general currency” to 
also assess data protection regulation and performance (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 26) and are 
explored below. This section amalgamates literature on regulatory governance and the EU 
smart  regulation  strategy  when  drawing  up  a  framework  against  which  it  assesses  the 24  IRION & LUCHETTA 
 
performance of EU data protection regulation. As an EU act, data protection is now expected 
to internalise the hallmarks of smart regulation. 
3.2.1  What good regulation has to achieve 
In the theory of regulation, “what constitutes ‘good regulation’ is difficult to establish and is a 
matter that is inevitably subject to contention” (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 37). As a bottom-line, 
Baldwin et al. (2012, p. 26) propose five criteria to identify good regulation: 1) legitimacy, 2) 
accountability, 3) due process, 4) expertise and 5) efficiency as well as effectiveness. This last 
criterion means efficiency in pursuit of the regulation’s objectives and its effectiveness. In 
addition the OECD (2005) advances a sixth criterion, policy coherence, which incidentally 
encourages harmonisation legislation in the EU aimed at the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market (Art. 114 TFEU). 
Beginning with the better regulation agenda, the 2010 EU smart regulation strategy of the 
European  Commission  stepped  up  its  commitment  to  manage  the  quality  of  regulation 
throughout the lifecycle (European Commission, 2010a).The strategy aims on the one hand at 
making regulation more efficient through an increasing reliance on ex ante impact assessment 
and ex post evaluation, which are evidence-based (linking it to criteria (5) above). On the 
other,  it  aims  at  reducing  administrative  burdens,  simplifying  legislation  and  making 
legislation  clearer  and  more  accessible.  The  latter  aim  adds  a  seventh  criterion  to  the 
catalogue, namely clarity. 
An eighth and final dynamic criterion (flexibility) helpfully expands this catalogue that is 
keeping pace with the economic and technological state-of-the-art (Black et al., 2005; OECD, 
2005).  The  resulting  catalogue  of  eight  criteria  that  characterise  good  regulation  is 
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Figure 2. Catalogue of criteria for good regulation 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
3.2.2  Assessing EU data protection regulation 
This section analyses the EU framework on data protection as it pertains to online personal 
data processing against the catalogue of criteria for good regulation. In retrospect it considers 
experiences with the EU regulatory framework on data protection and introduces a forward-
looking prognosis regarding the reform proposals. 
1)  Legitimacy 
In light of EU primary law and the new EU competence in Art. 16 TFEU, the legal basis and 
mandate  for  EU  data  protection  legislation  are  not  causes  for  concern.  Instead,  and  as  a 
recurrent feature of EU harmonisation legislation, the concerns centre on the dual aim of EU 
directives on data protection (see section 2.2.1). As one participant of the Task Force argued, 
the combined objective to ensure the protection of personal data and the free flow of personal 
data between member states creates tensions because of apparently clashing philosophies. 
However, the data protection Directive itself offers an interpretation that would reconcile the 
different ends. According to the Directive, member states should not restrict or prohibit in 
their national data protection laws the free flow of personal data within the EU (Art. 1(2)). 
• Legal  basis
• No tensions between different objectives
• Discretion and delegated acts
1) Legitimacy
• Democratic accountability of the regulator
• Legal redress
2) Accountability
• Procedural legitimacy (e.g. transparency)
• Stakeholder participation and consultation 3) Due process
• Individual expertise
• Reflexive governance 4) Expertise
• Efficient implmentation of legislative mandate
• Regulatory life-cycle management
• Enforcement and compliance
5) Efficiency/      
Effectiveness
• Individual policies are not internally contradictory
• Harmonisation of laws in the EU 6) Coherence
• Simplifying legislation
• Legal certainty 7) Clarity
• Technological neutrality
• Business model neutrality 8) Flexibility26  IRION & LUCHETTA 
 
Thus, in the internal market, cross-border processing of personal data should be enabled as 
long  as  personal  data  are  lawfully  obtained  and  processed  in  compliance  with  the  data 
protection Directive. What hinders EU-wide data protection appears to be more an issue of 
the  inconsistency  of  national  legal  frameworks  and  their  efficient  implementation  than 
tensions between the objectives of data protection and the internal market. 
2)  Accountability 
At the EU level, it can be observed that Art. 28(5) of the data protection Directive makes it 
obligatory for national DPAs to publish a report on their activities at regular intervals.  A 
critique, which is already embedded in the EU regulatory framework and therefore extends to 
the national level, is that DPAs may have too many different functions. A national DPA is 
expected to supervise, enforce, guide, advise, approve and advocate and, depending on the 
particular  role  assumed,  the  authority  is  required  to  constantly  change  perspectives.  This 
requirement may undermine the impartiality and arms-length relationship of the institution 
(Kantor, 2010, para. 106; RAND, 2009, p. 36). 
The  data  protection  Directive  requires  both  administrative  and  judicial  remedies  for  any 
breach  of  an  individual’s  rights  under  national  data  protection  laws  (Arts  22  and  28(4)). 
Commonly, the parallelism of regulatory supervision and judicial redress is considered to be a 
strong accountability mechanism. Ultimately, national courts oversee the decisions of national 
DPAs,  and  individuals  have  the  additional  possibility  to  call  on  national  courts  for 
decentralised  enforcement  of  the  data  protection  Regulation.  Insofar  as  democratic 
accountability of national DPAs and the right to appeal against their decisions are concerned, 
this has to be taken into account when assessing national data protection regimes.  
The accountability of data controllers and processors, however, is a question of regulatory 
effectiveness, as discussed below. 
3)  Due process 
A regulation adheres to due process requirements if regulatory procedures are sufficiently 
transparent (e.g. work programme, draft and final decisions are published) and participatory 
(consultations,  right  to  be  heard).  The  split  between  EU  legislation  and  member  states’ 
transposition  means that  local governmental and administrative culture will  influence due 
process in the implementation of the law. Nonetheless, there are issues of due process that can 
be traced back to the provisions of the EU data protection Directive. On a positive note, this 
Directive recognises the need for transparency in that it requires DPAs to maintain a public 
register of processing operations that have been notified to them (Art. 21(2)). 
Participation,  however,  is  less  pronounced  under  the  present  framework,  which  may  for 
example hamper due process when drawing up private codes of conduct at national and EU 
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representatives  irrespective  of  the  consideration  that  DPAs  are  supposed  to  make  up  for 
power imbalances (Poullet & Guttwirth, 2008, p. 27; RAND, 2009). Attention to the fair 
representation  of  the  interests  of  data  subjects  vis-à-vis  data  controllers  is  becoming 
paramount the more the information-rich economy progresses and the role of private policies 
increases (e.g. codes of conducts but also standards-setting). 
In the preparation of and during the legislative process of the data protection reform, the 
European Commission launched two public consultations and held targeted consultations with 
private sector organisations, NGOs and member states. It also convened public events and 
fora to discuss contemporary challenges to data protection, to introduce and stimulate reform 
proposals and to gather stakeholders’ feedback. Task Force members participated in these 
events and CEPS contributed by organising a public panel on data protection reform, adding 
to the host of events surrounding the international 2013 data protection day, celebrated on 
January 28
th every year.
12 
4)  Expertise 
In some regulatory regimes, there is pressure to delegate expertise to specialised agencies 
(Majone, 2005, p. 135; Gilardi, 2005, p. 102), while in data protection, DPAs were set up as 
guardians  and  to  institutionalise  data  protection  (FRA,  2010,  p.  10).  Bundling  expertise 
obviously  matters,  but  requiring  too  much  of  it  would  actually  be  counterproductive  to 
promote  good  practices  in  data  protection  (see  clarity  criteria  below).  However,  online 
personal  data-processing  practices  and  analytics  advance  rapidly  and  require  specific 
expertise that cuts across statistics, computer and system engineering and IT management. 
National DPAs have often been criticised for their lack of technical and IT forensic expertise, 
which  greatly  inhibits  their  ability  to  monitor  compliance  and  enforce  data  protection 
regulation in the context of online data-processing activities (Kantor, 2010, para. 105). 
Reflexive governance connotes a learning process that can complement the governance of 
data  protection  in  the  EU,  which  is  arguably  a  moving  target  that  requires  a  constant 
adjustment of regulatory focus. The expertise needed in the context of reflexive governance 
requires the definition of policy priorities, exercising discretion and anticipating problems, 
compromise  and  consensus-seeking  that  goes  beyond  the  exercise  of  top-down  authority 
(Poullet & Guttwirth, 2008, p. 27). WP29 exemplifies some aspects of reflexive governance 
already when setting priorities in the work programme and selecting problematic issues in the 
protection of personal data that are followed through (e.g. Google’s new privacy policy). 
The capacity for reflexive governance of DPAs at the national level varies, with some being 
less  able  to  effectively  set  and  follow  through  own  priorities  and  enforcement  strategies 
(European  Commission,  2003,  pp.  12ff;  FRA,  2010,  p.  42).  Given  the  ubiquity  of  data 
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http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/Data_protection_day_en.asp). 28  IRION & LUCHETTA 
 
processing activities, reflexive governance needs to be strengthened and effected at all levels 
(Poullet & Guttwirth, 2008, p. 27). 
5)  Efficiency and effectiveness 
This criterion tackles whether the legislative mandate has been implemented efficiently in the 
member states and whether data protection regulation is effective in practice.
13 It does not 
address the costs of compliance, which are taken up below (see section 3.3.5). 
  Efficient implementation of the legislative mandate 
The  implementation  of  the  data  protection  Directive  was  reviewed  in  2003  and  2007 
(European Commission, 2003 and 2007). Both reviews acknowledged progress made with 
respect to the internal market for personal data, but noted the differences between member 
states on how the Directive was transposed, applied and enforced. The European Commission 
could be “more robust in taking action against member states that manifestly do not properly 
apply the provisions of the directive” (Kantor, 2010, para. 91). 
In 2007, the European Commission was satisfied that the Directive ensured a high level of 
data  protection  (European  Commission,  2007a,  p.  9),  notwithstanding  that  most  evidence 
pointed towards deficiencies with compliance and enforcement (see below). Eventually, in 
2010 the European Commission concluded that the EU needed a more comprehensive and 
coherent policy on the fundamental right to personal data protection (European Commission, 
2010c), which led to the proposal for a general data protection Regulation in 2012 (European 
Commission, 2012a). 
  Effectiveness in terms of enforcement and compliance 
A lack of credible and effective enforcement is one of the weaknesses of the data protection 
Directive. For example, research that used the number of notifications (pursuant to Art. 18 of 
the  Directive)  as  indicators  for  assessing  the  effectiveness  of  the  Directive  regularly 
concluded that data controllers often do not notify DPAs about automated data processing 
operations (FRA, 2010, p. 29; European Commission, 2012b, p. 133). This criticism is mainly 
addressed to national DPAs, which do not adequately monitor and enforce data protection 
compliance (FRA, 2010, p. 29; Kantor, 2010, para. 104; see also European Parliament, 2011, 
paras  28  and  44).  In  addition  to  the  shortcomings  identified  in  relation  to  expertise  and 
accountability, DPAs’ watchdog function is particularly obstructed because: 
-  DPAs are under-resourced, both in terms of staff and financial means (FRA, 2010, p. 8; 
European Parliament, 2011, para. 28; Rand, 2009, p. 35); 
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regulatory framework on data protection; compliance consists of the actions undertaken by public and private 
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-  Member states emphasise ‘soft’ methods to promote compliance with data protection 
legislation  over  ‘hard’  instruments  that  would  enforce  and  sanction  non-compliance 
more rigorously (FRA, 2010, p. 8); 
-  Sanctions are ‘mosquito bites’ – to quote one of the contributors to the Task Force; in 
particular  the  maximum  amount  of  pecuniary  fines  is  insignificant  compared  to the 
revenues of large data controllers (FRA, 2010, p. 6); and 
-  Cross-border  cooperation  and  enforcement  action  among  DPAs  is  lacking  or 
insufficient (European Commission, 2012b, Annex 10). 
Individual  legal  remedies  before  courts,  albeit  in  place  in  all  member  states,  are  rarely 
resorted to (Korff, 2010, p. 98). Possible explanations of this lack of private enforcement 
action may be:  
-  Damages to the individual may not occur immediately after the violation of privacy 
obligations; 
-  Damages may be difficult to quantify; or 
-  Individual damages are too small to compensate  for the cost of  legal action (Rand, 
2009, p. 35). 
Effective  enforcement  is even  more under  strain  in the context of online data processing 
because: 
-  Probation of violations and damages is more difficult; 
-  The cross-border extent of data practices is the rule rather than the exception; and 
-  Cross-border  enforcement  of  legal  rights  before  the  court  is  more  cumbersome  and 
costly (European Parliament, 2011, para. 5; Rand, 2009, p. 41). 
Consequently, the European Commission’s proposal for a general data protection Regulation 
clarifies  enforcement  mechanisms,  introduces  higher  sanctions  and  new  consistency 
mechanisms  as  well  as  other  means  of  compliance,  such  as  the  appointment  of  Data 
Protection Officers (DPOs) by controllers (European Commission, 2012a). 
6)  Coherence 
Since the EU data protection framework pertaining to online personal data processing is a 
combination of different instruments (i.e. data protection Directive, e-privacy Directive as 
amended by the data retention Directive) as transposed into 27 member states national laws, 
overall consistency is known to be a major challenge. EU policy-makers, practitioners and 
pundits agree that the level of harmonisation achieved in data protection is not sufficient, and 
that  national  variations  in  terms  of  implementation,  interpretation  and  enforcement 
considerably  hamper  the  internal  market  for  legitimate  personal  data  processing  (see  in 30  IRION & LUCHETTA 
 
particular European Commission, 2012b, p. 11;  TrapleKonarskiPodrecki and Partners and 
European Legal Studies Institute, 2012 p. 42; Kantor, 2010, paras. 45ff.). 
One of the central motivations for the EU data protection reform is to establish a uniform 
general  data  protection  Regulation  (European  Commission,  2012a  and  b).  The  European 
Parliament (2011) in its resolution of 6 July 2011 on a comprehensive approach on personal 
data protection in the European Union agrees that full harmonisation is the way forward while 
maintaining the level of data protection that the EU data protection Directive of 1995 already 
provides.  
7)  Clarity 
A regulation which applies horizontally for all types of automated or systematic processing of 
personal data in the public and the private sector should gear for legal certainty
14 and clarity. 
By way of analogy, Task Force participants invoked public traffic rules, which would fail its 
primary objective to organise public traffic and protect all participants in it if the system of 
rules is too complex. Likewise, data protection regulation is bound to pervade all aspects of 
public  and  private  organisations’  activities  vis-à-vis  individuals  whose  personal  data  are 
protected subject matter. For its own sake, data protection should embrace simplicity because 
it is a driver of compliance. 
The envisaged Regulation that would bring about one single set of data protection rules in 
Europe is an important step in the right direction because it consolidates 27 member states’ 
jurisdictions. However, because the  new Regulation would  be directly effective, the  legal 
document has to engender policy acceptance directly flowing from its text. Conversely, most 
Task Force participants would concur that the reform proposal is astonishingly complex and, 
aside from any substantial critique, is capable of being implemented by larger organisations, 
but may fail to gain recognition by small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and individual 
data processors. This claim for simplification is not about deregulation: one can have very 
simple yet strict rules.
15 
8)  Flexibility 
Ultimately,  in  order  to  keep  pace  with  technical  and  economic  developments,  EU  data 
protection  regulation  should  maintain  the  principles  of  technological  and  business-model 
neutrality (Traple  Konarski Podrecki and European  Legal Studies Institute, 2012; RAND, 
2009,  p.  24).  Although  neutrality  is  a  guiding  principle  of  the  1995  Directive,  dramatic 
changes in data processing practices in scale, scope and magnitude rendered modernisation 
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will be applying the regulation in question. ONLINE PERSONAL DATA PROCESSING AND EU DATA PROTECTION REFORM  31 
 
necessary. The Regulation must be capable of internalising pending technological paradigm 
shifts,  such  as  cloud  computing,  and  be  sufficiently  flexible  to  apply  to  new  data-driven 
business models, e.g. big data. 
To  sum  up  the  assessment,  EU  data  protection  regulation  is  performing  reasonably  well 
against  criterion  #1  (legitimacy).  There  is  scope  for  improvement  regarding  #2 
(accountability) with respect to the omnibus role of DPAs, #3 (due process) with respect to 
participatory  processes  and  #4  (expertise)  with  respect  to  DPAs’  capacity  for  reflexive 
governance, while #6 (coherence)  is  being taken up  in the data protection reform. Major 
deficiencies show in two criteria, i.e. #5 (efficiency of the regulation) in terms of compliance 
and  enforcement  and  #7  (clarity),  in  terms  of  the  normative  framework.  The  regulation 
appears to internalise criterion #8 (flexibility), but practical applications are lacking, which 
could be a topic for an EU research and innovation priority. 
3.3  Economic analysis of data protection 
This section uses the economic analysis of regulation to advance the understanding why data 
protection as a regulatory regime struggles to deliver. 
More specifically, this section offers a positive economic analysis of data protection to answer 
three questions: 
-  How can personal information be framed in economic terms? 
-  Why  is  market  behaviour  irrational  and  do  consumers  value  privacy  and  data 
protection? 
-  What are the costs and benefits of data protection regulation? 
For reasons set out earlier, this report does not provide a normative economic analysis. 
There are a number of caveats: first, most economic research in this area tends to focus on 
static equilibriums and single transactions, and this may not be conducive to providing a full 
picture of iterative online data-processing processes (Acquisti, 2010a, p. 5). In other words, 
economic analysis is much more informed by short-term rather than long-term efficiency. 
Secondly,  it  is  difficult  to  properly  account  for  fundamental  rights  even  in  a  positive 
economic approach. Moreover, economics can hardly capture second-order effects, such as 
the right to privacy being an enabler for other democratic institutions and rights.  
3.3.1  Economics of information 
Some features of personal  information that are amplified in online data processing would 
challenge any regulatory scheme.  
Information is often equated with a ‘public good’, that is, a good that is characterised by two 
concepts:  non-excludability  and  non-rivalry  (Cohen,  2000;  Heverly,  2003).  The  former 32  IRION & LUCHETTA 
 
concept implies that it is not feasible, for technical or economic reasons, to restrict individuals 
from  consumption.  Once  information  is  divulged,  the  cost  to  replicate  information  is 
negligible, thereby creating a situation close to non-excludability. Non-rivalry implies that an 
additional  consumer  does  not  reduce  the  utility  for  the  existing  consumers.  Indeed, 
information seems, at first sight, also non-rival: if information is shared, the originator is not 
deprived of that same information. This can generate a market failure, however, contrary to 
the classic public good dilemma that leads to undersupply: information markets are believed 
to  diminish  societal  welfare  by  the  excessive  creation,  disclosure  and  trade  of  personal 
information. 
The public good nature of information is not uncontested; the reading of non-rivalry could be 
more  nuanced,  in  particular.
16Although  information  can  be  shared  without  the  originator 
being depleted, the value of information, i.e. the utility that an individual can extract from it, 
can  create  rivalry.  The  value  of  knowing  certain  classes  of  information  may  be  affected, 
positively or negatively, by the number of individuals sharing that knowledge (Renda, 2008). 
For example, the value of knowing that a specific consumer intends to buy a coffee machine 
is rivalrous, as its exclusive knowledge confers an advantage to the advertiser or dealer aware 
of this intention. Information may be subject to the ‘tragedy of the commons’, that is, to over-
consumption (Hardin, 1968). 
Either  way,  information  goods  are  prone  to  over-consumption,  including  ‘personal 
information’, which is the protected subject matter in data protection regulation. Regulatory 
intervention can set rules that would govern the collection and use of personal data in an 
attempt to maximise societal welfare. The underlying problem, however, persists because in 
the information-rich economy data-processing processes are ubiquitous and rule enforcement 
is a continuous challenge, as is underlined by the EU experience with data protection, and 
also with copyright enforcement with the latter being slightly more effective. 
3.3.2  Economic theory of privacy 
Early  Chicago  School  theorists  argued  that  any  regulation  that  would  restrict  personal 
information  disclosure  creates economic  inefficiencies  (Stigler,  1980;  Posner,  1981).  This 
view  is  in  line  with  the  economic  theory  that  asymmetric  information  causes  market 
distortions. Until recently, it was argued that the unrestricted sharing of consumer information 
would increase social welfare (see summary in Acquisti, 2010a, p. 4). Later contributions take 
a more critical stance in arguing that individuals do benefit from sharing certain information, 
but full disclosure is not in their best interest (Varian, 1996). 
Closer to today’s reality of online information processing, widening the focus from a single 
transaction to the whole set of transactions with many counterparts leads to very different 
results.  In  a  dynamic  multi-transaction  setting,  consumers  are  exposed to  future  potential 
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misuses of personal information, which may impose random costs (Acquisti, 2004, pp. 5ff). 
Disclosing personal data would be like signing a blank cheque: it may never come back to the 
consumer, or it may come back with an arbitrary low or high figure on it (Acquisti, 2010a, 
p.15).  
Disclosing  personal  information  in  a  certain  transaction  may  result  in  costs  for  the  data 
subject unrelated to that transaction. This means that the exchange of personal information is 
subject to a negative externality. More precisely, companies collecting personal data do not 
internalise  future  expected  costs  borne  by  individuals  (Lessig,  2006,  pp.  216ff.).  This 
externality  implies that, compared to the societal optimum,  individuals  may over-disclose 
information  and  companies  may  over-invest  in  collecting  information.  Such  negative 
externality, being another source of market failure, may justify public intervention. 
To conclude, economic theory is not monolithic when it comes to the economics of privacy 
and data protection.  
[D]epending  on  conditions  and  assumptions,  the  protection  of  personal  privacy  can 
increase  aggregate  welfare  as  much  as  the  interruption  of  data  flows  can  decrease  it 
(Acquisti, 2010a, p.19). 
3.3.3  The value of personal data 
The  economic  value  of  personal  information  for  data  controllers  is  measurable,  e.g.  by 
looking at their advertising value and revenues. Figure 3 below shows estimated advertising 
value of personal information for several large internet platforms. Revenues per record vary 
from company to company, from €3.6 per year for a professional social network up to €23.3 
per year for a large consumer-facing search engine and advertising network operator, such as 
Google. There is no data on what would be the effect if the collection and use of this personal 
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Figure 3. Estimated annual advertising value of personal information (€/record) 
 
Note: Y axis: €/year. 
Source: Peter Voigt (2012). 
Many online services’ business models operate as multi-sided platforms, often in an extreme 
form in which the consumer-facing interface is completely subsidised with revenues from the 
business-facing interface. Consumers’ personal data and attention are thus sought as input for 
the  business  model  of  online  advertisers  which  are  channelled  through  the  platform  (see 
Evans, 2013; Luchetta, 2013). The consumer-facing interface is free of charge to maximise 
participation.  
Multi-sided markets 
The  concept  of  multi-sided  markets  or  platforms,  developed  by  Rochet  &  Tirole 
(2003), are characterised by three elements: 
-  Two  or  more  groups  of  customers  who  are  simultaneously  served  by  the 
platform through distinct interfaces; 
-  The value that customers realise through their platform interface increases with 
the  number  of  customers  on  another  platform  interface  (so-called  ‘indirect 
externalities’); and  
-  The volume of transactions can be affected by charging more to customers at 
one interface and reducing the price paid by the customers at the other interface 
(a form of cross-subsidisation). 
Consumer valuation of personal information is commonly measured according to people’s 
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evidently markets for personal information, especially in the online economy, what can often 
be observed is that individuals apparently do not participate.
17 This is why research largely 
draws  from  economic  experiments.  Interpretations  of  research  data  about  individuals’ 
willingness to pay for privacy or accept rewards in exchange for their data draw a highly 
complex picture. 
3.3.4  Behavioural economics and privacy 
According to behavioural economics, when individuals are confronted with the challenges 
posed by disclosing and managing personal information, their choice is more often than not 
irrational. Research points to inconsistencies in individual decision-making: 
  A  vast  majority  of  individuals  are  concerned  about  loss  of  control  over  personal 
information, but they would disclose personal information for very small, even nihil, 
rewards (see Berendt et al., 2005; Compañó & Lusoli, 2010; BCG, 2012, p.13). 
  Privacy  behaviour  depends  on  the  context  and  is  easily  influenced  by  framework 
conditions, the order in which choices are presented to the consumer and the default 
state  (see  Acquisti,  2004;  Acquisti  &  Grossklags,  2004;  Acquisti  &  Gross,  2006; 
Acquisti et al., 2009). 
  “The ‘price’ people assign to protect a piece of information is very different from the 
price they assign to sell the same piece of information.” (Acquisti et al., 2009, p. 31). 
According to this ‘endowment effect’ in personal information selling, personal data are 
valued higher than buying privacy protection (Acquisti et al., 2009, p.31). 
  Where consumers are given more control, they tend to volunteer more, even sensitive 
personal information and allow more uses and disclosure (Brandimarte et al., 2010, pp. 
3ff; BCG, 2012, p. 15). 
  Often  individuals  do  not  differentiate  between  privacy  and  the  value  of  personal 
information,  but  if  made  aware  they  value  their  personal  information  more 
(Spiekermann et al., 2012). 
Social networks are a very good experimental test bed to study privacy decision-making (see 
box below). 
 
 
                                                 
17 There are many different reasons, but it seems that individuals are sometimes not aware of data processing 
activities (BCG, 2012, p. 12), or ignorant about privacy policies and unlikely future risks, or their personal 
information is tied to another transaction or ‘pays’ for a gratuitous online service they desire (‘Take-it-or-leave-
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Research on social network sites and privacy 
  While privacy attitudes matter in the decision whether to join Facebook or not 
(but only for the age cohorts and social groups for which Facebook is not a 
‘must-have’  platform),  the  amount  of  information  actually  disclosed  by 
Facebook users does not correlate with their privacy preferences (Acquisti & 
Gross, 2006). 
  Social networks’ different privacy policies make hardly any difference in terms 
of user behaviours (Bonneau & Preisbuch, 2010). 
  Independent from their degree of privacy concern, users are willing to pay to 
prevent deletion or sale of personal information included in Facebook profiles 
(Spiekermann et al., 2012). 
Where consumers are given the choice, both surveys and experiments confirm that a fair share 
of consumers value privacy and control: 
  A significant share of individuals is willing to pay a small premium for more privacy 
controls in online services if choice is part of the transaction (Krasnova et al., 2009). 
  Without price competition, the majority of consumers select a privacy-friendly offer; 
with price competition, a non-negligible proportion is still willing to pay a small mark-
up for privacy (Beresford et al., 2012; ENISA, 2012a, p. 1). 
However,  both  examples  presuppose  a  highly  transparent  choice  and  a  very  reasonable 
privacy mark-up, in other words what would be a market for privacy.
18 
More recent research suggests that the economics of privacy and personal information may be 
distinct because the former is about the value of keeping information undisclosed, whereas the 
latter “relates to all information people share” (Spiekermann et al., 2012, p. 3). As stated 
initially, individuals are not generally inhibited from sharing personal data but want to be 
assured that it flows appropriately (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 2; BCG, 2012, p. 42). There are 
indisputable  benefits  for  individuals  from  online  data-processing  activities,  such  as 
personalised services and relevant advertising, but such benefits are context-sensitive too. 
There are a number of reasons why these behavioural biases are large and relevant for data 
protection policies: 
-  Privacy policies (or fair information practices) are important transparency mechanisms, 
but  are  not  likely  to  be  decisive  in  determining  user  behaviour.  Simplification  and 
                                                 
18  When  juxtaposing  the  value  some  consumers  attach  to  privacy  (ENISA,  2012,  p.  36)  with  the  average 
advertising revenues  per record  (Figure  3),  companies  could  differentiate  their  services  and  charge  a  small 
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standardisation  of  privacy  terms  are  to  be  welcomed,  but  biases  do  not  depend  on 
limited information. 
-  In online transactions, product or service attributes are salient to consumers, but privacy 
attributes are not.
19 This means that frequently consumers will not weigh up the costs of 
data disclosure and will not select a privacy-savvy offer in a competitive market (except 
under experimental condition with perfect information). 
-  Consumers’ disclosure and privacy behaviour concerning their personal information is 
‘malleable’, which can  be easily exploited to obtain  more personal  information  and 
generate consent to its processing. 
-  Only if privacy choices are embedded in a given transaction and effectuated by rules 
and orders surrounding the sign-up are consumers  likely to align with their privacy 
preferences.  Hence,  opt-in  and  opt-out  rules  as  well  as  default  settings  have  strong 
impacts on the level of data disclosure. 
Acquisti (2010a, p. 6) concludes that “the market equilibrium will tend not to afford privacy 
protection  to  individuals”.  This  can  be  a  ground  for  regulatory  intervention  aiming  for 
privacy. Strategies discussed in the literature are reversing dynamics in online transactions 
(through  a  combination  of  managing the  default-setting,  consent  as  opt-in  and  separation 
principle) and introducing markets for privacy (OECD, 2011, p.28). 
  Role of defaults 
Defaults that favour privacy or not, and would hence require an overriding action by users, 
make  a  difference;  a  point  raised  by  many  Task  Force  contributors.  The  significance  of 
defaults can be witnessed in the discussions over the ongoing data protection reform and other 
significant developments, such as the ‘Do-Not-Track’ (DNT) browser settings (see box in 
section  4.2.3).  Policy-makers  should  be  vigilant  about  explicit  or  implicit  defaults  in 
standardisation, regulation and private policies.  
  Consent and the opt-in/ opt-out debate 
In a similar fashion, the consent of individuals is often the prerequisite for the legitimate 
processing of personal information. In online transactions, obtaining data subjects’ consent is 
sensitive to how it is declared: as an opt-in where an active action is required or as an opt-out 
where the given consent is a default and the user would need to change it. Already under the 
present  EU  data  protection  Directive,  simple  inaction  is  deemed  insufficient to  constitute 
valid consent (Kosta, 2013; WP29, 2011, p. 12). 
                                                 
19  A  product  attribute  is  salient  when it  is relevant  to  a  consumer’s  choice  (see  Korobkin,  2003).  In  each 
transaction,  only  a  few  attributes  are  ‘processed’  by  the  consumer.  Firms  can therefore  explore non-salient 
attributes in their favour. For example, it is claimed that legal warranties are not salient, and therefore firms will 
always draft warranties in their favour. In a nutshell, there is no competition on non-salient attributes. See also 
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  Separation principle 
The separation principle, as it is known, would unbundle an online service from secondary 
data processing (such as marketing unrelated to the customer relationship, profiling or the 
transfer of personal data to third parties) and ultimately reinforces how ‘free’ the consent is 
(no ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ transactions; see BCG, 2012, p. 111). A strict separation principle 
would mandate the provider to offer two transactions on separate terms (ENISA, 2012, p. 3; 
Novotny & Spiekermann, 2012, p.5).
20 As a follow-up problem, the question will arise how to 
determine a fair premium for more privacy vis-à-vis the provider, which may ultimately call 
for regulatory intervention. 
  Markets for privacy 
Promoting markets for privacy could be a promising strategy to help privacy attributes to 
become more salient in competition. If trust was truly to become a key market differentiator, 
as Task Force participants proposed, then companies’ reputation and privacy-savvy offers 
should face competition. There are a few additional measures that help improve privacy to 
become a more salient attribute for competition. First, certification and public trust marks or 
seals can signal adherence to high privacy standards. Second, in some markets, such as social 
networks, data portability may significantly lower switching costs for users (Costa & Poullet, 
2012, p. 257; European Commission, 2010c, pp. 7ff).
21 
3.3.5  Costs and benefits of data protection law 
Understanding the costs and benefits of data protection regulation can inform public policy 
and help better calibrate regulation. The data available are still very fragmented and far from 
complete, but allow a glimpse into the problem. 
Quantifying  the  costs  and  benefits  of  data  protection  regulation  for  individuals  and  data 
controllers has not yet been accomplished. From the perspective of data controllers, certain 
costs  of  data  protection  measures  are  known,  but  aggregate  costs  are  still  unspecified 
(European Commission, 2012b, Annex 10; Ponemon Institute, 2011). Moreover, determining 
which costs can be attributed to regulation and which costs a company would bear out of 
other considerations (such as brand reputation) is difficult to establish. Where they occur and 
are  made  public,  privacy  breaches  can  have  a  significant  impact  on  public  trust  in  the 
company concerned, which can affect other profit-generating operations. 
                                                 
20 It should be noted that for a number of online services that are offered for business and retail customers this 
type of versioning is already practised, e.g. Google apps for business. For various reasons, e.g. confidentiality 
and legal obligations, business customers tend not to tolerate the processing of (personal) data for secondary 
purposes. 
21 NB: the similarity to number portability in electronic communications in Art. 30 of the universal service 
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The costs and benefits of data protection regulation for consumers receive little attention, also 
because normative arguments are commonly resorted to. Possible costs for consumers are 
often  framed  as  identify  theft  and  related  abuse  of  personal  data,  but  also  foregone 
opportunities and  monetary disadvantages  should be taken  into account, above all  ethical 
implications. According to a US example, opportunity costs of reading online privacy policies 
would amount, in the US alone, to $781 billion per year (McDonald & Cranor, 2008, p. 561). 
Hence, consumers are also burdened and regulation can alleviate their need to micro-manage 
privacy preferences. 
To sum up, state-of-the-art cost-benefit analysis only confirms that making all data public is 
welfare-diminishing, and so is full privacy. From an economic point of view, data protection 
regulation has to reconcile the protection and the flow of personal information. In principle, 
there is an optimal level of data protection regulation, but, given the state of the art, it is not 
possible to locate it with any degree of precision. There is no indication whatsoever if the 
existing legal framework is on the right or the left of the optimum, that is, whether more or 
less privacy would be beneficial. 
Figure 4. The optimal amount of privacy regulation 
 
Source: Boehme (2012). 
Future research should be directed at understanding whether the benefits of data protection 
regulation are truly translating in practice. According to cost-benefit analysis, benefits are 
maximised when the difference between societal benefits and the cost of privacy precautions 
is the largest. If enforcement is lower than optimal (up to the case of no enforcement), a 
rational  actor  will  choose  a  lower  level  of  privacy,  where  the  difference  between  the 40  IRION & LUCHETTA 
 
controller’s private benefits and the costs of precaution are maximised. At the same time, 
societal  welfare  would  not  be  maximised  if  it  is  not  clear  how  to  meet  regulatory 
requirements. Depending on the perceived risk of sanctions, a company may either play it 
safe, therefore taking more precautions than optimal from a welfare economic point of view, 
or play it boldly, also creating a welfare loss due to lower privacy benefits.  
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4.  Old paradigms and new approaches to data protection regulation 
This section deconstructs the conceptual approach behind EU data protection regulation in 
order  to  identify  systematic  shortcomings  before  discussing  possible  avenues  for 
modernisation from different angles. 
4.1  Deconstructing the conceptual approach behind EU data protection 
regulation 
The EU data protection framework rests on a so-called a priori and horizontal regulatory 
approach. A priori regulation means that prior formalities must be complied with in order for 
data processing activities to be lawful (see RAND, 2009, p. 20). As a horizontal instrument, 
data protection Regulation applies across all sectors’ automated or otherwise systematic data-
processing  activities  (see  European  Commission,  2012b,  p.  148). It  appears  that the  new 
fundamental  right to  data  protection  in  the  CFR  endorses  this  approach  (see  also section 
2.1.2). 
In  this  section,  the  discussion  takes  up  a  number  of  core  data  protection  concepts  and 
contemporary challenges they are facing. In the discussion about the reform proposals these 
core concepts have turned out to be highly politicised, despite the fact that they are already 
part of the EU data protection acquis. Therefore the following discussion about the conceptual 
approach behind EU data protection regulation is timely. 
4.1.1  Personal data and special categories of personal data 
‘Personal data’ is an important concept because it essentially determines the subject-matter 
scope of data protection regulation, therefore triggering the application of the obligations 
incumbent upon data controllers and processors (European Commission, 2010c, p. 8; RAND, 
2009, p. 26). According to the definition in the data protection Directive, personal data consist 
of “any information relating to an identified or identifiable person” (Art. 2(a)). It is interpreted 
to comprise all direct and indirect ways to single out an individual (European Commission, 
2012c, p. 8; WP29, 2007; 2013, p. 1).  
Because of their sensitive nature, special categories of personal data receive a higher level of 
protection. The data protection Directive defines as special categories data revealing racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, 
and health or sex life (Art. 8(1)). The rationale for the special protection is the associated 
higher risks in processing such information, which is relatively uncontested. 
Any data that do not relate to an individual or, although constituting personal data, has been 
“rendered anonymous  in such a way that the data subject is  no  longer  identifiable” (data 
protection Directive, Rec. 26) are not considered personal data. 
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  The  concept  of  personal  data  does  not  differentiate  between  different  categories 
corresponding to different sensitivities or risks (‘one-size-fits-all’) (BCG, 2012, p. 14; 
RAND, 2009, p. 26). 
  The higher protection for special categories of personal data is arbitrary in that it does 
not include other, possibly equally sensitive categories. 
  There  are  differences  of  opinion  about  whether  online  identifiers  are  or  should  be 
considered personal data (pro: WP29, 2007, p. 14; 2013, p. 1; cautious: RAND, 2009, p. 
27) and 
  Concerning  the  retracting  boundaries  of  the  anonymity  frontier,  there  are  questions 
whether data protection should subsist up to defined levels of relative anonymity (BCG, 
2012, p. 36; Ohm, 2010). 
Each point of contention is considered below in more detail. 
  Personal data as a one-size-fits-all concept 
The advantage of a one-size-fits-all approach to personal data is that it is flexible to apply in 
different situations and circumstances, underpinning the horizontal approach of the regulation. 
The criticism favours a more granular understanding of personal data categories according to 
associated sensitivities or risks (BCG, 2012, p. 14; RAND, 2009, p. 26). The critique does not 
stick because a differentiated treatment does not allow for the exclusion of any personal data 
under the subject-matter scope of application of the regulation. 
  Special categories of personal data are arbitrary 
The existing catalogue of specially-protected categories of personal data is rarely contested 
for its content, but rather for its arbitrariness, for example: 
-  Individuals in most European countries tend to consider financial information as highly 
sensitive  (see  BCG,  2012,  p.  43;  RAND,  2009,  p.  26),  but  under  data  protection 
Regulation it is not. 
-  The e-privacy Directive introduces special protection for traffic and location data that 
exceeds that provided by the data protection Directive for non-sensitive personal data 
(even if they are not considered a special category of personal data). 
-  Processing biometric information may involve similar risks as the processing of genetic 
data, but the proposal for a new general data protection Regulation integrates only the 
latter in the catalogue of special categories of personal data (European Commission, 
2012a, Art. 9(1)). 
-  Also,  a  comprehensive  digital  identity  (see  box  below)  is  not  especially  protected, 
although longitudinal and combined data sets can be very revealing about individual 
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Digital identity 
“A  digital  identity  is  the  sum  of  all  digitally  available  data  about  an  individual” 
(BCG, 2012, p. 35). 
Inherent characteristics. Where does an individual come from and who is she or he? 
Date of birth, gender and nationality are examples of this type of information. 
Acquired  characteristics.  What  is  an  individual’s  story?  His/her  history?  Here, 
information such as address, medical record, social capital (added by the authors) and 
purchases history are relevant. 
Individual preferences. What does an individual like? Data types here would include 
interests, hobbies and favourite music (amended by the authors). 
Source: BCG (2012, p. 36), with some amendments. 
 
  Personal data and online identifiers 
Whether online identifiers are considered as personal data has far-reaching implications for 
the  scope  of  data  protection  Regulation.  The  increasing  reliance  on  online  identifiers, 
especially  on  the  internet  (such  as  IP  addresses,  cookies,  location  data,  and  browser 
fingerprinting)  would  trigger  the  application  of  data  protection  Regulation.  The  WP29 
underlines that for identifiability it suffices if an individual can be singled out (WP29, 2007, 
p. 14; 2013, p. 1). This interpretation is contested, however, not the least by online companies. 
The proposal for a general data protection Regulation lists online identifiers expressly in the 
definition of data subjects but also maintains that not all online identifiers need “necessarily 
be  considered  as  personal  data  in  all  circumstances”  (Recital  24).  These  contradictory 
references  to  online  identifiers,  which  the  reform  proposal  sets  out  to  improve,  must  be 
resolved (Traple Konarski Podrecki and Partners and European Legal Studies Institute, 2012, 
p. 25). 
When taking this decision,  it is  important to bear  in  mind the close relationship  between 
online identifiers and ‘pseudonymisation’, as well as the regulatory objective to harness the 
use of privacy-enhancing technologies (hereinafter, PETs, see section 5.2.2). Because online 
identifiers could also be perceived as “retraceably pseudonymised data” (WP29, 2007, p.18), 
any  solution  has  to  be  internally  consistent.  Besides,  the  use  of  PETs  would  hardly  be 
encouraged if online identifiers did not fall under the scope of data protection regulation.
22 
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Today’s data protection Directive (Recital 26) and the reform proposals aim to decide on the 
legal nature of an online identifier by taking into account “all the means likely reasonably to 
be  used  either  by  the  controller  or  by  any  other  person  to  identify  the  said  person”.  
Identification  thus  does  not  require  the  person  to  be  named  or  correlated  to  an  official 
identifier, such as ID numbers, addresses, etc. Second best to the WP29’s interpretation of 
‘singling out’ is the proposal to take the intention of the controller and processor into account 
(in quoting the UK ICO 2012
23 and also Traple Konarski Podrecki and Partners and European 
Legal Studies Institute, 2012, p. 48). In both cases, processing information in connection with 
online  identifiers  is going to be regarded as personal data – a regulatory decision that  is 
appropriate in most situations.  
  The anonymity frontier 
Neither anonymous nor anonymised data fall under the scope of data protection regulation 
because anonymous data does not relate to an individual; while anonymised data becomes 
anonymous because the individual is no longer identifiable (WP29, 2007, p. 21; 2012, p. 1). 
The  challenge  is  establishing  if  digital  data  are  (still)  anonymous  because  technical  and 
methodological advancements continue to push back the anonymity frontier (see, generally, 
Ohm, 2010). Anonymity  is an  important concept because  it is one of the best (technical) 
strategies to privacy and data protection. 
In principle, many purposes for which data processing is deployed can be achieved by using 
anonymous data, e.g. audience measuring tools could rely on collecting aggregate data of 
page views
24 (WP29, 2012, p.10). This should create a strong incentive to use anonymised 
data whenever possible, but controllers can face a trade-off between privacy and utility (BCG, 
2012, p.16). Although techniques that are more efficient in this trade-off, i.e. sacrifice less 
utility for more privacy, have been developed, anonymisation necessarily implies a loss of 
information. Research disagrees on the utility of anonymised datasets (sufficient according to: 
Aggarwal & Yu, 2008, p. 25; Novotny & Spiekermann, 2012, p. 11; insufficient: Ohm, 2010, 
pp. 1753ff), but this can hardly be generalised as it depends on the context and purpose of the 
data processing in question.  
With the concept of real  anonymity  becoming  increasingly  contested, EU data protection 
regulation already supports a relative notion according to which “account should be taken of 
all  the  means  likely  reasonably  to  be  used  to  identify  an  individual”  (data  protection 
Directive,  Recital  26).  This  would  require  a  better  definition  of  anonymous  data
25  and 
                                                 
23 As proposed by the UK ICO (2012, p. 5): “Where IP addresses or similar identifiers are processed with the 
intention  of  targeting  particular  content  at  an  individual,  or  otherwise  treating  one  person  differently  from 
another, then the identifier will be personal data and, as far as is possible, the rules of data protection will apply.” 
24 After a cookie has been installed on the end-user terminal, for details see WP29, 2012, p.10). 
25 As foreseen in the draft report of the LIBE Committee, European Parliament, by Albrecht (2012): “This 
Regulation should not apply to anonymous data, meaning any data that cannot be related, directly or indirectly, 
alone or in combination with associated data, to a natural person or where establishing such a relation would 
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possibly a technical implementation guidance clarifying a threshold, in terms of statistical 
probability  of  re-identification,  under  which  a  dataset  can  be  considered  sufficiently 
anonymous. This should be flanked with a prohibition to intentionally break the anonymity 
barrier, which would also trigger obligations incumbent on data controllers. 
4.1.2  Principles relating to data quality 
The data protection Directive formulates five broad principles relating to data quality (Art. 
6(1); see  box  in  section 2.2.1): In short, there are 1) fairness and  lawfulness, 2) purpose 
specification,  3)  collection  limitation,  4)  data  quality  and  5)  use  limitation.
26  Collection 
limitation and use limitation are also combined in the principle of data minimisation. The 
principles’ combined purpose is to narrowly frame the processing of personal data. It is a 
perceived strength of the principles-based framework that it permits flexibility (RAND, 2009, 
p. 24) while at the same time operationalising at a high level the correct input of personal data 
in relation to a given processing activity (or purpose) and how data should be treated. 
It  would  appear,  however,  that  a  few  of  these  principles  are  increasingly  contested  by 
economic developments and social practices. Most obviously data minimisation seems at odds 
with an information-rich society (see e.g. Novotny & Spiekermann, 2012, p. 3). Under the 
current rules “[c]ollecting data because they might prove useful in the future would be in 
breach of both the purpose limitation principle and the data minimisation principle” (Van der 
Sloot & Borgesius, 2012, p. 92). However, this is exactly what many companies are doing and 
hoping  to  exploit  in  the  near  future  (De  Hert  &  Papakonstantinou,  2012,  p.135).  This 
perception was shared by many Task Force participants who call for more flexibility when it 
comes to potential uses of personal data held by these companies. 
Conversely, it can be argued that: 
Data minimisation, i.e. processing and storing only those personal data that are necessary 
for  a  legitimate  purpose,  is  becoming  more  and  more  important  when  technical 
limitations  to  storage,  processing  and  transfer  capacity  are  quickly  disappearing,  and 
when at the same time security risks and data breaches are becoming more prevalent 
(European Commission, 2012b, p. 96). 
Data minimisation should remain a central descriptor of data quality, not least because it is 
backed by good practices from information assurance, management and security. Overall, one 
Task Force contributor maintains that the principles governing data quality have been very 
                                                                                                                                                   
technology at the time of the processing and the possibilities for development during the period for which the 
data will be processed.” 
26 These principles build conceptually on two international standard-setting instruments: the non-binding 1980 
OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data and the Council of 
Europe’s (CoE) Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
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successful as a defining concept for the protection of personal data because they are still the 
most intuitive element of this regulation. 
4.1.3  Roles and responsibilities 
Data  protection  regulation  rests  to  a  large  extent  on  the  definition  of  roles  to  which 
obligations  and  accountability  are  attached.  Central  roles  are  data  controllers  and  data 
processors. The present data protection Directive defines, on the one hand, the controller as 
those persons or bodies, public or private, “which alone or jointly with others determine the 
purposes and means of the processing of personal data” (Art. 2(d)). The processor, on the 
other hand, is any other body “which processes personal data on behalf of the controller” (Art. 
2(e)). Controllers must be accountable for complying with the regulation on personal data 
protection, whereas processors are not. 
In  light  of  distributed  data  processing  practices  and  data-sharing  arrangements,  this 
conception meets with a number of challenges and criticisms: 
  In the case of joint controllers, how to ensure a line of accountability that is adequate to 
the shared control over personal data? 
  With  respect  to  determining  the  means  of  processing,  can  the  present  delineation 
between controller and processor still be maintained given that processors are gaining 
increasing control over the means (RAND, 2009, p.36; Traple Konarski Podrecki and 
Partners and European Legal Studies Institute, 2012, p.9)? 
  Do consumers and end-users become controllers in cloud computing? 
      Joint controllers 
The  present  data  protection  regulation  acknowledges  that  joint  control  can  exist  in  the 
definition  of  controllers,  but  it  does  not  clarify  how  the  arrangement  may  distribute 
responsibilities among them. As it stands, each of them carries full responsibility. In its draft 
for  a  general  data  protection  Regulation  the  European  Commission  proposes  a  shared 
responsibility that, however, carries the risk of obscuring overall accountability (European 
Commission, 2012a, Art. 24). To ensure unified accountability over the process, it would be 
preferable to designate a lead controller according to the relative weight in determining the 
purpose,  condition  and  means  of  data  processing.  The  other  controllers  would  remain 
responsible  for  compliance  with  regulatory  obligations  according  to  their  particular 
contributions as assigned to them by the lead controller. 
  Relationship between controllers and processors 
Distributed  personal  data  processing  has  also  reshuffled  the  relationship  between  data 
controller  and  processor.  The  chains  of  delegation  are  getting  longer  with  more  sub-
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out the  tasks  assigned  to them  by  the  data  controller.  Under  the  present  regulation,  it  is 
unclear  to the  participating  stakeholders  “when  a  processor  becomes  a  controller  or  vice 
versa” (RAND, 2009, p.36).
27 
 
Cloud computing 
Cloud computing  is a major paradigm shift  in  networked computing. Digital data 
resides and computing is performed on powerful computing platforms (‘the cloud’), 
which can be accessed remotely.
28 
Business customers of cloud services benefit from lower prices, minimal upfront IT 
investments  and  scalable  as  well  as  customisable  services.
29  Consumers’  end-user 
terminals are about to become ‘thin clients’ that rely on cloud services for access to 
software, computing and storage. 
The relationship between a customer of cloud services, whether a business client or a 
consumer,  and  the  provider  can  be  difficult  to  fit  into  roles  defined  under  data 
protection  regulation,  i.e.  controller  and  processor  (Hon  et  al.,  2011,  pp.11-22). 
Depending on the context, this relationship can be heavily intertwined and dynamic 
where  data  protection  regulation  presumes  a  controller’s  determination  of  the 
purposes, conditions and means of the processing of personal data. 
Whenever  the  cloud  service  provider  uses  its  clients’  personal  data  for  its  own 
purposes, it would qualify as a controller fully liable to data protection compliance. 
 
The solution of extending more leniency to processors in deciding about the means of data 
processing has been put forward (Traple Konarski Podrecki and Partners and European Legal 
Studies Institute, 2012, p.9) and is also supported by some Task Force participants. Although 
this  solution  may  resolve  some  confusion  about  roles,  it  can  create  gaps  in  the  process-
oriented accountability. In fact, the means of data processing carries a stand-alone risk for the 
protection of personal data; important procedural aspects and decisions are deployed, such as 
algorithms. Regulation should therefore not be blind to the means even if this aspect of data 
processing is no longer under the exclusive control of the controller. Here, parallel to reducing 
                                                 
27 In addressing the problem, the draft proposal for a general data protection Regulation provides: “If a processor 
processes personal data other than as instructed by the controller, the processor shall be considered to be a 
controller in respect of that processing […]” (Art. 26(4)). 
28 According to the definition of the US National Institute for Standards and Technology, cloud computing is “a 
model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources 
(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service provider interaction” (NIST, 2011). 
29 For a full taxonomy of cloud services, see NIST (2011). 48  IRION & LUCHETTA 
 
the  level  of  responsibility  on the  part of  the  controller,  accountability  on  the  part of  the 
processor would need to be stepped up. Other regulatory strategies may also be affected when 
surgically removing the means of data processing from the responsibility of the controller. For 
example,  privacy  by  design  may  fall  between  what  the  regulatory  responsibilities  of 
controllers  and  processors  (Traple  Konarski  Podrecki  and  Partners  and  European  Legal 
Studies Institute, 2012, p.32). 
  Are consumers really controllers? 
Another paradoxical result would be one in which consumers are legally the controllers of 
their personal data that reside in the cloud without the possibility to exercise control. As it is 
common in end-user markets, the underlying contractual relationship is based on a contract of 
adhesion that predefines the terms and conditions of service. In this case, the consumer as 
controller cannot impose  much control on the processor, which somewhat contradicts the 
conceptual approach in data protection where the processor is an ‘auxiliary’ of the controller. 
There should be a rule under the scope of data protection regulation that prohibits individuals 
from acting as the controller of their own personal information if the information resides in 
third-party equipment. 
4.1.4  Informed consent and control 
Individuals’ control exercised through consent is an important concept in the fundamental 
rights  approach  to  data  protection  (WP29,  2011,  p.8).  Consent,  as  defined  in  the  data 
protection Directive, is “any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by 
which  the  data  subject  signifies  his  agreement  to  personal  data  relating  to  him  being 
processed” (Art. 2(h)). At the time of collecting personal data, controllers have to provide a 
minimum set of information (Art. 10), which also allows the consent to be ‘informed’. Out of 
six alternative legal grounds, the individual’s consent has emerged as the most significant 
basis  for  legitimate  personal  data  processing  by  far  (Art.  7(a)).  Task  Force  participants 
confirmed the prominent role of consent in facilitating personal data processing. 
The regulation’s ideal notion of consent does not always translate into practice and certain 
points of criticism are frequently raised: 
  The link between the information about data processing and consent is weak (Acquisti, 
2010b, p. 19; RAND, 2009, p.44). 
  The capacity to consent does not often give effective control to users and individuals 
about the use of their personal data (Acquisti, 2010a; 2010b, p.19). 
  A definition of consent should be more flexible to allow different types of consent that 
fit the context and type of data at issue (BCG, 2012, p. 15; WEF, 2012, p. 24). 
Different stakeholders  have different  issues  with the consent requirement, which  explains 
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aim to strengthen individuals’ consent. The reason why informed consent has not delivered 
(yet) can be explained in a number of ways, notably by economics (see section 3.3) and a 
tendency to generate consent instead of extending controls to users and individuals. Some 
Task Force participants believe that increasing the formal requirements for obtaining valid 
consent may result in a shift towards more subscription-based online services, and that larger 
online service providers are in a more advantageous position than smaller ones. 
Despite these shortcomings, consent as a legal basis for data processing is necessary because 
it  remains  the  best  lynchpin  for  quasi-market  mechanisms  in  personal  data  transactions. 
Consequently, the draft proposal for a general data protection Regulation ramps up the formal 
conditions for consent (Art. 7) and stresses the need for “a genuine and free choice” (Recital 
32). The draft proposal carries an embryonic ‘separation principle’ (Recital 25), but a more 
straightforward rule should be included in the Regulation. The burden of proof showing that 
the data subject consented to the processing of their personal data would be unequivocally 
placed on the controllers (Art. 7(1)). 
To  conclude  this  section,  with  some  fine-tuning  the  basic  conceptual  approach  to  data 
protection regulation is fit to carry the regulatory treatment of personal data processing into 
the future. The horizontal and technologically neutral approach needs to be preserved; data 
quality principles remain an essential conceptual framework; individuals’ consent should be 
improved but caution may be needed when adjusting roles of controllers and processors. The 
regulatory approach very much underpins what a number of studies recommend as a thorough 
change of culture towards privacy as a virtue or a new paradigm for digital identity (BCG, 
2012; WEF, 2012). 
Towards a new paradigm for digital identity 
“To unlock the full value, organisations need to make the benefits of digital identity 
applications very clear to consumers. […] 
As we show in this report, three elements are essential to ensure a sustainable flow of 
data: 
First, the benefit a consumer receives has to exceed the ‘cost’ of sharing the data. 
Second, there needs to be transparency in how the data are used. While this might 
initially reduce sharing, it limits the risk of brand damage and helps to attract more 
informed customers. 
Third, privacy controls should be available and easy to use. They will significantly 
increase data-sharing by individuals, likely offsetting any negative impact on sharing 
resulting from increased transparency.” 
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4.2  Compliance, risks and management 
Instead of changing the basic conceptual approach, modernising data protection should focus 
on enhancing compliance, balancing risks and improving the management of data protection. 
A  necessary  ingredient  is  more  legal  clarity,  because  data-protection  regulation  is  often 
implicit when it should be direct. 
4.2.1  Tensions between regulation and compliance 
In order for regulation to achieve its objective, addressees must be motivated to comply and 
that compliance must not ‘outsmart’ the regulation. Presently, there is a paradoxical situation: 
practitioners,  policy-makers  and  pundits  concur  that  compliance  is  rather  low  and  many 
controllers ignore data-protection regulation in part or entirely (see, for example, the SME 
survey, European Commission, 2012b, Annex 8; Kuner, 2012b). Conversely, there are very 
responsible  companies  that  invest  in  compliance  management  relating  to  data-protection 
regulation that should make a difference to the privacy and data protection of individuals and 
users. But this too is not always a certain outcome. 
Complex  and  composite  online  transactions  that  involve  a  good  or  service  and  personal 
information as by-product prevail (ENISA, 2012a, p. 9). Consumer-facing businesses collect 
personal data in the course of a legitimate transaction, i.e. the primary purpose being the 
performance of a contract (data protection Directive, Art. 7 (b)). In order to facilitate the data 
processing for additional purposes, the original transaction has to help generate individuals’ 
consent (data protection Directive, Art. 7 (a)). This is when the objective to generate valid 
consents  may take priority  for  many  businesses over offering their customers true choice 
concerning the processing of their personal data for other, unrelated purposes (see Laudon, 
1996, p.99). 
Task Force participants were concerned about their ability to obtain consent, and stressed the 
economic repercussions that would occur if data protection regulation were to firmly require 
opt-in and introduce a separation principle, as explained in section 3.3.5. However, it should 
not be forgotten that the present regulatory regime eases the processing of personal data in 
preparing or carrying out a contract. 
As it stands, data-protection regulation could be applied in such a way that systematically 
undermines its very aim, that is, to protect the fundamental right to privacy with respect to the 
processing of personal data (data protection Directive, Art. 1(1)). Flexibility is needed where 
it can aid innovation, business models but also users and consumers to manage their privacy 
preferences. However, it should not be possible to invoke flexibility against the spirit of the 
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4.2.2  Implicit regulation 
Implicit  regulation  is  an  important  issue  in  that  it  contributes  to  regulations  not  being 
sufficiently accessible to inexperienced practitioners. Even though the regulation is internally 
consistent,  some  major  applications  are  not  directly  addressed.  The  following  examples, 
which illustrate the problem, are discussed below. 
  The purpose for which personal data are processed 
  ‘Legitimate interest’ of the data controller 
  Data transfers to third parties 
 
  The purpose for which personal data are processed 
The purpose for which data are processed is a central notion in data-protection regulation, but 
it is not defined.
30 The data controller determines the purpose alone or jointly with others 
(data  protection  Directive,  Art.  2(d)),  whereas  the  legitimate  basis  for  personal  data 
processing  is  defined  in  relation  to  each  purpose.  When  the  first-generation  EU  data 
protection  framework  was  issued,  automated  data  processing  was  characterised  by  filing 
systems  and  computer  mainframes  (RAND,  2009,  p.7).  Contemporary  data  processing  is 
more  integrated,  interconnected  and  diffuse,  thereby  challenging  any  understanding  along 
discrete lines of processing operations. 
In terms of general administrative burden, it matters if purpose is defined more inclusively. It 
is  to  be  welcomed  that,  according  to  the  draft  proposal  for  a  general  data  protection 
Regulation, consent “should cover all processing activities carried out for the same purpose.” 
(European Commission, 2012a, Recital 25) For example, the purpose of marketing is very 
broad, which potentially covers all types of marketing, such as direct marketing and targeted 
advertisements.  Because  online  behavioural  advertising  relies  on  tracking  individuals’ 
preference online as a self-standing input, the entire practice cannot be generally subsumed 
under the purpose of marketing, which is commercial communication (see box). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 The data protection Directive uses the notion in two different connotations: firstly in a more general sense to 
describe sectoral data processing activities such as “purposes of journalism or for purposes of literary of artistic 
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Online behavioural advertisement 
Online  behavioural  advertising  is  a  combination  of  online  tracking  and  targeted 
advertisement.
31 
Internet  users’  browsing  history  and  other  preferences  are  tracked  to  create 
preference-based profiles, and  correspondingly targeted advertising  is displayed to 
users. 
On the one hand, as a particular practice online behavioural advertisement can help 
making advertising more relevant for users, and as a marketing technique it is deemed 
more efficient compared to other advertising methods online (e.g. Beales, 2010). 
One  the  other  hand,  the  2011  Eurobarometer  survey  showed  that  four  out  of  ten 
Europeans  are  concerned  about  their  online  behaviour  being  recorded  and  in  just 
below half of the EU member states the majority of users surveyed are concerned 
about profiling on the internet (European Commission, 2011, p. 67). 
Where online behavioural advertising is facilitated by installing a tracking cookie, 
prior informed consent of the individual user is required under the e-privacy Directive 
(Art. 5(c)) (WP29, 2010a). 
In  Europe,  industry  associations
32  adopted  best  practice  recommendations  on 
behavioural advertising and set up a website for users to opt-out.
33 Nonetheless, this 
best practice recommendation was not approved by the responsible EU body because 
it does “not result in compliance with the current e-privacy Directive” (WP29, 2011, 
p.12).  
 
When discussing personal data processing it is useful to distinguish between primary and 
secondary purposes.
34 Pronouncing the difference between primary and secondary purposes 
can greatly enhance the clarity of the regulatory logic. On the one hand, the primary purpose 
often  concerns  a  processing  necessary  for  the  performance  of  a  contract.  The secondary 
purpose, on  the  other  hand,  connotes the  use  of  personal  information  for  a  different  and 
unrelated purpose that would need a separate legal ground for legitimate data processing (data 
protection Directive, Art. 7). 
                                                 
31 As a 2012 ENISA study puts it: “Much of the debate today focuses on [online behavioural advertising] instead 
of tracking. […] Tracking is the problem – not behavioural advertising” (ENISA, 2012c, p. 20). 
32 i.e., the European Advertising Standard Alliance and the Internet Advertising Bureau Europe. 
33 See (www.youronlinechoices.eu). 
34 This separation is implicit in data protection regulation (Korff, 2010, FN 114) when it provides that personal 
data must be “collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes (i.e. primary purpose, authors’ addition) 
and  not  further  processed  (for  secondary  purposes,  authors’  addition)  in  a  way  incompatible  with  those 
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  ‘Legitimate interest’ of the data controller 
The ‘legitimate  interest’ of the data controller can render the processing of personal data 
legitimate if certain conditions are met (data protection Directive, Art. 7 (f)). The ‘legitimate 
interest’  test  involves  a  balancing  exercise  between  the  legitimate  interest  of  the  data 
controller and the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject. Although 
inherently flexible, this legal ground is very vague and “thus the one perhaps most in need of 
clarification as to how it can and should be applied in specific contexts” (Kantor, 2010, p.32; 
see also Traple Konarski Podrecki and Partners and European Legal Studies Institute, 2012, 
p.10).  
Task  Force  participants,  for  example,  prefer  not  to  rely  on  ‘legitimate  interest’  for  data 
processing  as  it  is  today,  but  see  a  lot  of  potential  if  the  new  General  Data  Protection 
Regulation would better operationalise the ‘legitimate interest’ test. Clear boundaries would 
be helpful to delineate what data processing purposes can be performed under this flexible 
clause.  
  Data transfers to third parties 
In data protection regulation, which also aims at establishing an internal market for personal 
data, the disclosure, sharing and transfer of personal data is generally acknowledged. Strictly 
speaking, when the first controller discloses personal data to one or several third parties, this 
constitutes a distinct processing purpose.
35 The recipient who (is not an auxiliary processor) 
but  intends to process personal data  for own and unrelated purposes becomes the second 
controller and would need legitimate grounds. The regulatory requirements for lawful data 
processing become very difficult to adhere to for any further instances of disclosure to third 
parties. 
The  above  is  to  illustrate  that  certain  practical  questions  are  not  addressed  in  the  legal 
framework as they should be. Data transfers to third parties are increasingly inherent in online 
personal  data  processing  and  the  law  has  to  afford  clarity  about  what  practices  are  in 
compliance with data protection regulation. 
4.2.3  Timing and scalability 
This final point highlights the importance of timing and scalability of regulatory intervention 
in order for data protection to keep pace with technological and economic developments. 
Timing matters because, after its collection, the lifecycle of personal data is no longer linear, 
but multiplies. Measures to protect privacy and data protection must be scalable in order to 
have  some  effect  in  ubiquitous  data  processing.  Both  time  and  scalability  underpin  the 
principle of data minimisation (ENISA, 2012b, p.4).  
                                                 
35 The first controller is required to inform the data subject about the recipients of the data (data protection 
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The EU regulatory framework presupposes individuals’ control at the stage of the collection 
of personal data and with regards to specific purposes. One significant implication of today’s 
online data processing practices is that it is no longer feasible or even adequate to expect 
control  to  be  exercised  on  a  per  unit  basis  and  vis-à-vis  each  controller.  Instead,  data 
protection regulation must rely on a summary or proxy approach, i.e. wholesale means of 
expressing privacy preferences and complying with data protection regulation. One example, 
if realised, would be the Do Not Track (DNT) browser settings (box below). 
 
The Do Not Track (DNT) browser settings 
DNT would allow internet users to express their choice of online tracking vis-à-vis 
other websites through their browser settings.
36  
To have recipients accept and conform to DNT, the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C) is drawing up a recommended standard, expected to be finalised in 2014.
37 
Top EU policy-makers welcome these efforts: “the DNT standard must be rich and 
meaningful  enough  to  make  a  difference,  when  it  comes  to  protecting  people’s 
privacy. It should build on the principle of informed consent, giving people control 
over their information. And, indeed, it must be designed to let people choose to not be 
tracked.” (Kroes, 2012) 
 
In the online environment, interoperability is an architectural principle running through the IT 
stack  and  interfaces  bridges  between  different  technology  layers.  Such  interfaces,  i.e. 
middleware and application programming interfaces,cannot only facilitate the exchange of 
information  but  could  also  leverage  data  protection  more  effectively.  Online,  various 
platforms (e.g. operating systems, in cloud computing platforms as a service and app stores) 
are  competing,  yet  within  their  respective  developers’  environment  they  cater  for  the 
possibility to exchange data, including the personal data of users. These are the bottlenecks 
where PETs should be deployed and users should be able to exercise centralised control over 
personal data exchanged.
38 
                                                 
36 It is implemented as a HTTP header added by the browser to the IP packet through which it requests content 
from a website. If the header has value 0, the user is expressing consent to tracking; if the header has value 1, the 
user is negating consent to tracking. If the user does not set the value, the header has value null and does not 
prevent tracking. 
37 See W3C Working Group of Tracking Protection at http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection (accessed on 
20 March 2013). 
38 Zittrain (2008) in his seminal book explained that the architecture of online platforms takes the shape of an 
hourglass, the waist-line is the platform to which, on the one side other services and applications connect, and on 
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To  conclude  this  section,  the  key  concepts  in  data  protection  discussed  above  are  not  as 
affected by dramatic technological developments as is sometimes claimed. The regulation is 
flexible  and  can  be  applied  in  different  situations  and  circumstances,  underpinning  the 
horizontal approach of the regulation. The basic concept still provides a consistent framework 
that allocates roles, responsibilities and rights – with only a few adjustments necessary, for 
example reorganising roles such as data controllers and processors in accordance with today’s 
needs. 
Regulation has an important role to play in underpinning the impending shift of culture and to 
deliver  against  the  objective  of  data  protection,  but  may  require  removing  known 
disincentives  for  compliance.  Aside,  regulatees’  ability  to  situate  themselves  in  what  is 
required  under  data  protection  may  be  sacrificed  in  the  regulatory  maze.  Legal  clarity  is 
compromised because too many concepts are implicit. The early timing and scalability of any 
measures that aim at enhancing privacy and data protection is increasingly important for the 
regulation to make an impact. 
5.  Modernising data protection regulation 
This  section  first takes  a  step  back  when  looking  at  proposals  for  how to  fundamentally 
rethink data protection (i.e. ‘out of the box’ modernisation) before turning to modernisation 
that builds on the existing acquis (i.e. ‘inside the box’ modernisation).  
5.1  Reconceptualising data protection 
The idea to reconceptualise data protection is mainly motivated by “the economic reality of 
information richness on one side and increasingly voluminous data protection legislation on 
the  other”  which  are  arguably  drifting  apart  (Novotny  &  Spiekermann,  2012,  p.2;  also 
Laudon, 1996, p.92). As an attempt to embrace radically different conceptions that would 
more adequately protect personal data, three influential concepts are discussed: propertisation, 
contextual integrity, and an abuse centred approach to regulation, which are briefly explained 
below. 
5.1.1  Propertisation 
First,  proponents  of  the  property  approach  suggest  conferring  property  rights  to  personal 
information  (Laudon,  1996;  Purtova,  2012;  Schwartz,  2000;  inter  alia  Novotny  & 
Spiekermann,  2012).  A  property  right  lends  itself  as  a  reference  framework  because  – 
contrary to data protection in its present form – it is more recognised in the public mind. 
Property rights possess three key attributes: they are exercisable erga omnes,
39 alienable, and 
divisible (Lyndskey, 2013). 
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As an advantage, a property regime allocates unambiguous rights and responsibilities, thereby 
fostering personal information markets. It would overcome the dilemma with present data 
protection regulation in which roles are defined, such as data controllers, to which a set of 
obligations are attached. Instead, the protection vested in personal data becomes more fluid 
because the obligation applies to all subjects (i.e. erga omnes). A number of ambiguities with 
existing  roles  could  thus  be  avoided  (see,  for  example,  the  difficult  question  in  cloud 
computing  of  who  the  data  controller  and  who  the  processor  is).  Beyond  this  small 
accomplishment, data protection regulation already permits transactions involving personal 
information,  insofar  as  individuals  can  consent  to  the  processing  of  their  personal  data. 
Alienability is probably at odds with the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection, 
under which personal data belongs to the data subject even where it is legitimately processed. 
Moreover, whether property rights in personal information would tangibly protect personal 
information  better  is  disputable.    In  economics,  property  rights  are  a  means  of  reducing 
scarcity  (which  was  induced  by  non-excludability)  by  promoting  incentives  in  their 
acquisition, creation and improvement. In digital information the nature of the problem is 
inversed in that there is an overconsumption (see section 3.3). Introducing property rights to 
force scarcity rather than to reduce it is unlikely to produce the desired outcome.
40 Finally, 
responsibilities  would  be  fully  transferred  to  data  subjects.  In  light  of  the  economic 
peculiarities of personal data and insights from behavioural economics, this may still require 
regulatory intervention. At the same time, propertisation of personal data does not follow the 
legal traditions of many national property right systems and will be accordingly met with 
political and legal resistance. 
5.1.2  Respect for context 
Contextual  integrity  is  an  influential  concept  originating  from  Nissenbaum  (2010).  In  its 
original  connotation,  for  personal  data processing to  be  permissible,  consistency  with  the 
underlying  consumer  relationship  and  the  context  of  the  data  disclosure  is  required. 
Contextual integrity is now taken up as one of seven principles in the US proposal Privacy 
Bill of Rights (The Whitehouse, 2012) which does not have legal force (see box below). The 
concept’s  salience  stems  from  its  relative  flexibility,  which  resonates  very  well  with 
stakeholders,  including  the  Task  Force  participants.  It  is  also  diffused  in  the  discussions 
surrounding the EU data protection reform. 
Respect for Context Principle 
“Consumers have a right to expect that companies will collect, use, and disclose 
personal data in ways that are consistent with the context in which consumers 
provide the data. Companies should limit their use and disclosure of personal data to 
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those  purposes  that  are  consistent  with  both  the  relationship  that  they  have  with 
consumers and the context in which consumers originally disclosed the data, unless 
required by law to do otherwise. If companies will use or disclose personal data for 
other purposes, they should provide heightened Transparency and Individual Choice 
by disclosing these other purposes in a manner that is prominent and easily actionable 
by consumers at the time of data collection. If, subsequent to collection, companies 
decide to use or disclose personal data for purposes that are inconsistent with the 
context in which the data was disclosed, they must provide heightened measures of 
Transparency and Individual Choice. Finally, the age and familiarity with technology 
of  consumers  who  engage  with  a  company  are  important  elements  of  context. 
Companies  should  fulfil  the  obligations  under  this  principle  in  ways  that  are 
appropriate for the age and sophistication of consumers. In particular, the principles 
in the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights may require greater protections for personal 
data obtained from children and teenagers than for adults.” 
Source: US Privacy Bill of Rights proposal (The Whitehouse, 2012). 
Whether  this  principle  would  ameliorate  the  EU  regulatory  framework  on  personal  data 
protection is doubtful (as advocated by Alvaro 2012, p. 12). Both tiers that would define the 
consistency of personal data usage with the underlying context are already firmly embedded 
in the present regulatory framework. The data protection Directive holds that personal data 
must be “collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in 
a way incompatible with those purposes” (Art. 6(1)(b)). Hereinafter, the data processing is 
legitimate if it is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party 
(data  protection  Directive,  Art.  7(b)).
41  The  contract  is  a  context  that  would  combine  a 
number  of  purposes  for  which  personal  data  is  processed  (e.g.  communication  with  the 
customer, facilitating payment, personalising the service, entry into customer database etc.). 
No consent is required in addition to this. Contextual integrity would implicitly feature in 
determining  whether  the  data  controller  could  invoke  his/her  legitimate  interest  (data 
protection  Directive,  Art.  7(f)),  and  could  also  define  the  limits  for  invoking  legitimate 
interest.
42 
                                                 
41 In addition, under the e-privacy Directive 2002/58/EC as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC, with regards to 
storing information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user (e.g. 
cookies) as  strictly necessary in order to provide an information society  service explicitly requested  by the 
subscriber or user (Art. 5(3)); with regards to email marketing in a customer relationship as long as customers 
can opt-out (Art. 13 (2)). Only the processing of location data and traffic data is to be based on the consent of the 
users or subscribers even if they are processed in the context of a value added service (Arts 6(3) and 9(1)). 
42 See also the proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation, Recital 40: “The processing of personal data 
for other purposes should be only allowed where the processing is compatible with those purposes for which the 
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5.1.3  Abuse-centred approach 
A third and highly controversial idea considers an abuse-centred approach, thereby shifting 
from a priori protection to a posteriori regulation of data abuse.  
[I]t can be questioned whether the European data-protection system, with its focus on a 
priori regulation of data collection and processing, can be upheld much longer in a world 
where  data  processing  occurs  in  so  many  ways,  to  such  an  extent,  and  for  so  many 
purposes as it does today. Shifting the focus of legal protection to a posteriori regulation 
of data abuse might turn out to be a better strategy to protect individuals in the long run 
(Koops et al., 2007, p. 154). 
The  abuse-centred  regulatory  approach  has  operated  since  2007  as  an  exemption  to 
unstructured  processing  in  Sweden  (Magnusson  Sjöberg,  2007,  p.111).
43  In  principle,  it 
allows data processing unless processing constitutes a misuse of the privacy of an individual. 
Legal changes are considered to be a reaction to the CJEU seminal judgement in Lindquist 
(CJEU,  judgement  of  6  November  2003,  Case  C-101/01).
44  It  is  important  to  note  that 
Swedish data protection regulation is reactive only in unstructured processing activities, i.e. 
the  facilitation of everyday processing of personal data  in electronic communications and 
ordinary composing of text (Kosta, 2013). In cases of structured processing activities, that 
would concern most online data processing activities by companies, this rule could therefore 
not be invoked. 
A general overhaul of online consumer data protection in the EU in favour of a posteriori 
regulation  of  data  abuse  may  not  be  adequate  in  light  of  the  fundamental  right  to  data 
protection in Art. 8 of the CFR. An abuse-centred approach to data protection could further be 
contested  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ECtHR,  which  ruled  that  Art.  8  ECHR  entails  a 
positive obligation to introduce measures that would give effect to the right for respect of 
private life including in the private sphere (ECtHR, X and Y v Netherlands, judgement of 26 
March 1985, para. 23). 
To conclude this section, all proposals for reconceptualising data protection struggle with the 
issue of delivering a real benefit for the protection of personal data. Market- and property-
based approaches to data protection, especially, have little impact on the current debate. Data 
protection  regulation  in  Europe  is  more  likely  to  evolve  in  a  path-dependent  way,  and 
modernisation is more likely to bring about piecemeal changes to the existing conception of 
data protection regulation. Some ideas would ramp up consumer protection style or/ and risk-
based regulation (Kantor, 2010, para. 57; RAND, 2009, p.26 and p.30). 
                                                 
43 It remains open whether the CJEU would uphold this interpretation as complaint with the data protection 
Directive.  
44 The Lindquist case concerned the publication of personal data on an internet website. The CJEU clarified that 
on the internet personal data are made public and accessible for an unlimited number of people, and therefore the 
processing cannot be considered a purely private matter and falls within the application of the general data 
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5.2  Meta-governance approach to data protection 
What  is  more  promising  to  revive  the  virtues  of  privacy  and  data  protection  is  a  meta-
governance  approach  to  this  policy  issue,  where  regulation  is  but  one  of  several  pillars 
supporting the overall policy. Such a meta-governance approach combines policy consistency 
and joined-up governance over a series of public and private measures that share the same 
vision. For the EU this approach would have the advantage that privacy and data protection 
becomes more firmly embedded in public and private sector activities and related values are 
reinforced at various levels.
45 
 
Figure 5. Meta-governance approach to data protection 
 
Source: Own representation based on Carblanc (2010). 
Member states and the EU would need to co-operate at all levels and ensure the optimal 
attainment  of  data  protection  through  a  variety  of  measures.  Once  adopted, the  proposed 
general data protection Regulation would become the centre-piece of this strategy but there is 
an important role for private policies. However, this normative basis needs to be accompanied 
by  other  measures  that  tackle  technological  and  cultural  aspects  of  privacy  and  data 
protection, in particular. 
                                                 
45 There are some areas where the EU already harnesses meta-governance, e.g. the European Commission’s 
Safer  Internet  Programme,  which  is  mainly  about  children’s  internet  use,  see 
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5.2.1  Private policies 
In the context of online data processing, resorting to the knowledge and expertise of private 
organisations can strongly enhance the effectiveness of the whole data protection framework. 
EU  data  protection  regulation  is  already  seeking  to  encourage  codes  of  conduct  as  a 
contribution to the proper implementation of the rules while taking account of the specific 
features of the various sectors (data protection Directive, Art. 27(1)). Codes of conduct are 
neither self-regulatory nor co-regulatory, because national DPAs or, in the case of EU-wide 
codes, the WP29 can ascertain whether the proposed code is in accordance with the law. 
There  has  been  criticism  that  this  approach  has  not  been  very  successful  given  the  low 
number of codes adopted in  line with this procedure (European Commission, 2003, p.26; 
RAND, 2008, p.37; see also box on Online behavioural targeting in section 4.2.2).
46 
The  draft  proposal  for  a  general  data  protection  Regulation  by  and  large  continues  this 
practice, but foresees (for now) a role for the European Commission to grant general validity 
to codes of conduct within the EU (European Commission, 2012a, Art. 38). It is important to 
clarify how codes of conduct in the area of data protection fit into the wider framework for 
private  policy-making  with  the  participation  of  EU  bodies.  The  2003  inter-institutional 
agreement  on  better  law-making  prohibits  the  use  of  self-  and  co-regulation  where 
“fundamental rights are at stake” (European Parliament et al., 2003). Finally, provided this 
obstacle can be overcome, there should be a clear reference to good practices in self- and co-
regulation,  such  as  transparency,  representativeness  of  stakeholders,  accountability  and 
enforceability, among others.
47 Moreover, once a code of conduct has been approved by the 
competent public body at national or EU level, would compliance with the code be deemed as 
being compliant with data protection legislation? (Kuner, 2012a, p.16) 
Outside of Binding Corporate Rules, private policies are often somewhat narrowly equated 
with collective codes of conduct. Currently there are a number of single firms in the online 
environment whose policies and terms of use can influence the conditions for privacy and 
data protection  for a  large share of  individuals  and users. Here, an  individual  company’s 
example  can  signpost  good  practices  for  a  whole  industry  and,  vice  versa,  reflexive 
governance can monitor large data controllers’ practices.
48 
                                                 
46 So far only one, i.e. European code of conduct of FEDMA for the use of personal data in direct marketing and 
the online marketing Annex as ascertained by opinion 4/2010 of the WP29 (2010b) but “the implementation of 
Directive 2002/58/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC, into Member States' legislation may require the 
amendment of the Annex, particularly as far as cookies and spyware are concerned to be in line with the new 
provisions.” Another request from IATA did receive a positive comment from WP29 in 2001.  
47 Also in the light of the forthcoming “Code for Effective Open Voluntarism: Good design principles for self- 
and co-regulation and other multi-stakeholder actions” promoted by the European Commission, DG CONNECT. 
48 E.g. DNT controversy over Microsoft’s early move, see The New York Times “Do Not Track? Advertisers Say 
‘Don’t  Tread  on  Us’”,  published  13  October  2012,  (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/technology/do-not-
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5.2.2  Technology 
Among  policy-makers,  harnessing  technology  for  privacy  and  data  protection  online  is 
possibly  the  most  promising  avenue  aside  of  regulation.  Three  intervention  points  and 
practices are presently considered: 1) standardisation and 2) PETs and privacy by design, both 
of which are backed-up by 3) independent audits and/or certification of compliance with EU 
data protection regulation. 
  Technical standardisation processes 
In  its  impact assessment, the European Commission already takes up the possible role of 
technical standardisation processes (European Commission, 2012b, pp. 47, 63, 87, 92; see 
2007b, p.7). The internet largely builds on open technical standards, which are devised by 
international, often private, standardisation bodies.
49 These standards define crucial building 
blocks, such as protocols and interfaces (APIs), in the internet’s IT stack. Some of the most 
significant developments for effective privacy controls are expected from accepted outcomes 
of standardisation, such as the DNT browser settings (see box in Section 4.2.3).
50 Privacy and 
data  protection  are  certainly  not  absent  from  standardisation  processes  today,  but  would 
certainly benefit from a sustained representation in standardisation bodies with a view on 
creating compatible solutions to the EU data protection regulation. 
  Privacy enhancing technologies and privacy by design 
Technology can  be  both privacy  invasive and privacy enhancing, and to a large extent  it 
depends  on  the  patrons’  decision  about  how  to  reconcile  a  given  functionality  with  data 
protection  requirements.  Privacy  by  design  is  a  particular  approach  to  privacy-enhancing 
technologies  (PETs)  “where  privacy  considerations  are  integrated  from  the  start  with  the 
business model as well the systems and processes of the organisation” (London Economics, 
2010, p. 31). Because privacy is difficult to retro-fix in information systems without incurring 
other  significant  trade-offs,  it  is  important to  address  implications  of  data  protection  and 
privacy before they are commissioned (Kantor, 2010, para. 131). The proposal for a general 
data protection Regulation carries as new principles privacy by design and by default (Art. 
23). The European Commission and member states can promote research and development of 
PETs  by  making  it  one  of  the  priorities  in  their  respective  research  and  innovation 
programmes, such as EU’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation framework. 
EU funded PET research 
                                                 
49 Most significant are the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 
among many others not mentioned here, but also the International Standards Organisation (ISO) and increasingly 
the International Telecommunications Union’s (ITU) Standardisation Bureau. 
50 However, privacy standards are not always adopted in the market, e.g. the Platform for Privacy Preferences 
Project (P3P) was developed and recommended by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) in 2002, but it 
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Sixth  Research  Framework  Programme  (FP6,  2002-2006),  ICT  for  Trust  and 
Security: 
  PRIMELIFE: bringing Sustainable Privacy and Identity Management to Future 
Networks and Services. 
  PICOS: Privacy and Identity Management for Community Services. 
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7, 2007-2013), Secure, dependable and trusted 
Infrastructures: 
  PRIME:  developing  solutions  for  solutions  on  privacy-enhancing  identity 
management.  PRIME  received  the  2008  HP-IAPP  Award  in  the  category 
‘Privacy Innovation Technology’. 
  FIDIS:  developing  new  ways  of  dealing  with  identities,  including  so-called 
user-controlled virtual identities, embodying concepts such as pseudonymity, 
anonymity and strong identification, as required by circumstances. 
Source: European Commission at http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict. 
  Data protection audits and certification schemes 
Certification schemes (or privacy seals) can be a way to recognise and showcase compliance 
with EU data protection rules, which may become especially relevant in online personal data 
processing  (European  Commission,  2012b,  p.47  and  p.112).  Certification  is  consequently 
encouraged under the draft proposal for a general data protection Regulation that would take 
into account “the specific features of the various sectors and different processing operations” 
(Art. 39). With a view to the costs of certification this measure would not be mandatory for 
controllers (European Commission, 2012b, p.112). It is important that certification ties in with 
technical  standardisation,  however,  where  appropriate,  including  with  regards  to  PETs. 
Experience gained in other sectors should guide the implementation of certification schemes, 
e.g. the forthcoming JRC study on privacy seals and trustmarks (Tirtea, 2013). 
5.2.3  Cultural 
Finally, cultural impulses are indispensible to promote privacy and data protection in the EU 
and beyond. Measures have to target data subjects, controllers, processors and professional 
groups equally and should, wherever possible, be integrated with other policy fields at EU and 
member state level.  
The role of education and awareness raising is largely recognised among EU policy-makers 
(European Commission, 2010c, p. 8; European Parliament, 2011, paras 16 and 18), e.g. the ONLINE PERSONAL DATA PROCESSING AND EU DATA PROTECTION REFORM  63 
 
Fundamental Rights and Citizenship programme of the European Commission DG Justice.
51, 
Measures  need  to  be  more  systematic  and  sustainable,  however,  as  well  as  adequately 
resourced. 
In addition to transparency and awareness, individual empowerment needs better tools and 
tactics for data subjects to recognise and control the collection and use of their personal data. 
PETs can be deployed at both ends, by controllers and data subjects. There are many useful 
applications for consumers and users that could be presented, explained and made available 
on a user-friendly online portal. 
Capacity-building  concerns  the  need  to  support  the  training  of  EU  data  protection 
professionals and sensitising relevant professionals to the fundamentals rights dimension and 
regulatory implications. In light of impending requirements for data controllers to appoint 
data protection officers (hereafter DPOs), this needs to be matched with publically accredited 
training programmes and online resources to develop these new capacities. Privacy by design 
requires patrons to subscribe, but also software developers and IT processionals to be attuned 
to his aim. 
The EU and member states should leverage privacy and data protection best practices as a 
horizontal issue through public procurement and other publically funded programmes, e.g. the 
existing incorporation of ethics in EU research and innovation policy.
52 
All in all, the new Regulation should be firmly embedded in an overall strategy that combines 
various approaches that would jointly contribute to privacy and data protection and integrate 
this concern widely in other public policies and programmes. 
6.  (R)evolution? The reform of EU data protection  
There is broad consent that the first-generation EU data protection framework is in need of 
reform in order to 1) better reflect significant advancements in information technology and 
systems; 2) formulate responses to the ubiquity of personal data processing; and 3) overcome 
fragmentation in the internal market. The 2010 Digital Agenda for Europe proposed a review 
of the EU data protection rules as one of the key actions (European Commission, 2010b, 
p.13). On 25 January 2012 the Commission published a draft for a Regulation with the aim of 
modernising  the  legal  framework  and  enhancing  the  trust  and  confidence  of  European 
consumers (European Commission, 2012a). 
Against this backdrop, the draft proposal for a general data protection Regulation pursues two 
general objectives: 1) to enhance the internal market dimension of data protection and 2) to 
increase the effectiveness of the fundamental right to data protection (European Commission 
                                                 
51 See (http://ec.europa.eu/justice/grants/programmes/fundamental-citizenship/index_en.htm). 
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2010c, p. 5; 2012a; European Parliament 2011). The proposal is based on the premise that the 
existing data protection level is to be maintained. 
Contributors to the Task Force emphasised the fact that the reform is an evolution in that it 
modernises existing rules and not a revolution in the sense that it would overhaul the data 
protection acquis. Task Force participants generally welcomed the proposal to introduce a 
single set of rules for the EU and a number of proposed measures that benefit data controllers, 
e.g. removing the notification requirement and the vision of a ‘one-stop-shop’ according to 
which one DPA in the EU is responsible for a controller. Reflecting the division of interests 
among stakeholders, other aspects of the reform proposal were the subject of more fervent 
debate, in particular key concepts, the definition of which influences the scope of application. 
This  section  does  not  offer  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  draft  Regulation  but  necessarily 
focuses on three issues: overcoming fragmentation, regulatory innovation, and major critical 
issues that remain unresolved. 
6.1  Overcoming fragmentation  
Once adopted, the Regulation would overcome the present fragmentation of data protection 
rules, because its provisions would be binding and directly applicable in the member states 
(TFEU, Art. 288). Indisputably, the Regulation  would unleash  much potential  for  making 
business throughout the EU (digital) single market, since the processing of personal data is 
today almost commonplace in every company, e.g. employees’ data processing and among 
groups of companies. Unifying rules also implies that differences are levelled out even where 
national or local good practices have successfully taken hold (see, for example data protection 
officers in Germany described in Kuner 2012a). 
Online personal data processing – the subject of this Task Force – is bound to thrive on fully 
harmonised rules. Task  Force participants and contributors discussed two issues  in which 
fragmentation is likely to persist: 1) regulatory competences and 2) the regulatory division of 
labour between general  and sectoral data protection rules,  including  legislation  mandating 
data processing operations from private parties. 
6.1.1  Regulatory competences 
The one-stop-shop premise may not be fully accomplished. The draft proposal for a general 
data protection Regulation links supervisory competences to the main establishment of the 
data controller or processor (Art. 51(2)). The notion of main establishment is defined, but the 
definition presupposes a centralised decision-making structure in relation to decision-making 
about data processing (Art. 4(13)). Task Force participants argue that decisions about data 
processing are made in a more decentralised fashion, according to the distributed work-share 
within the group or corporation. If, however, the place of the central administration in the EU 
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of  main  establishment  in  relation  to  decision-making  about  data  processing  becomes 
superfluous (see also Falque-Pierrotin, 2012, p.5). 
Participants in the Task Force expressed concern that the extensive consistency mechanism 
that any other DPA, the new European Data Protection Board, and the European Commission 
can request may significantly inflate the back-end of the one-stop-shop premise (Arts 57 and 
58; see Traple Konarski Podrecki and Partners and European Legal Studies Institute, 2012, 
p.45).  Nevertheless,  a  consistency  mechanism  is  deemed  necessary  in  order  to  build  the 
mutual trust in shared regulatory supervision in the first place. What could be contested is the 
overall capacity of the consistency mechanism to comply with potentially several hundreds of 
notifications  about  draft  measures  and  requests  at the  same  time.
53  How to  reconcile  the 
consistency  mechanism with the  independence of DPAs  is another open question (Kuner, 
2012a, p.20). 
Finally, the Regulation’s intention to introduce a regulatory one-stop-shop in the EU could be 
problematic in member states with more than one public authority in charge of data protection 
supervision  (see  section  2.3.1).  A  federal  system  would  also  designate  one  responsible 
authority; however, sectoral divisions of competences may add up, especially in countries in 
which supervision for general data protection and in electronic communications (pursuant to 
the e-privacy Directive) is distinct. The draft proposal for a general data protection Regulation 
prescribes designating a “single contact point”; a pragmatic solution that was piloted under 
the  services  Directive  (Directive  2006/123/EC  of  12  December  2006  on  services  in  the 
internal market).  
6.1.2  Regulatory division of labour 
The residual division of labour between general data protection legislation and national laws 
pursuant to the e-privacy Directive will continue to exist once a new general data protection 
Regulation enters into force (see section 2.2). In the present EU regulatory framework sectoral 
data protection rules are lex specialis with respect to the data protection Directive, which 
means  that  specialised  rules  take  precedence  over  general  ones.  The  ensuing  regulatory 
division of labour is not trivial because an EU regulation is directly effective and supersedes 
member states’ laws. The relationship between sectoral norms and the new regulation needs 
clarification, which the draft proposal for a general data protection Regulation does not fully 
achieve (Art. 89). 
Due to the shift towards digital services, the economic significance of the e-privacy Directive 
is  mounting  steadily,  with  the  effect  that  it  develops  into  a  mainstream  data  protection 
instrument (see section 2.2.2). Online personal data processing tends to be covered by both, 
                                                 
53  When  juxtaposing  the  proposals  with  the  consistency  mechanism  under  the  regulatory  framework  for 
electronic  communications,  which  already  incurs  a  heavy  workload,  the  number  of  cases  is  largely  pre-
determined by the number of recommended relevant markets multiplied by the number of member states (so-
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general  and  sectoral  instruments.
54  Task  Force  participants  realise  that  fragmentation  will 
persist in many important details covered by national laws pursuant to the e-privacy Directive. 
Task Force contributors, including from the European Commission DG CONNECT, are well 
aware of the two tracks, which can be explained against the background of competencies and 
reform agendas opening different windows of opportunity to introduce new data protection 
rules. Prospectively, data protection rules that apply across the information society and value 
added  services,  which  involve  the  processing  of  personal  data  emanating  from  electronic 
communication services, should be transferred and thereby unified within the Regulation. 
Significant  fragmentation will also occur with regards to legislation at EU and especially 
member state level mandating data processing operations to the controller for general interest 
purposes, e.g. national transpositions of the data retention Directive (see section 2.2.3). In 
addition to this, each member state maintains countless national laws that data controllers may 
need to be aware of if their operations fall within the jurisdictions of different member states. 
In most instances, this is not a question of harmonisation, but of transparency. Member states 
should be encouraged to draw up a public repository of rules that mandate the collection, 
conservation or retention, and disclosure of personal data  from private parties, which are 
controllers. This is critical because businesses may find it difficult to navigate the national 
systems of data protection and other opposite obligations. It can also help policy-makers to 
shift perspective from a single measure to a systematic view on data processing. 
Another area that should be observed  is general competition  law, even though  it protects 
undistorted competition, not privacy and data protection as such. Personal data assets will be 
scrutinised under EU and member states’ competition law and merger control sooner or later, 
the more they become an integral part of companies’ business models (Almunia, 2012). 
6.2  Modernisation 
The  scale  and  magnitude  of  online  personal  data  processing  is  widely  perceived  as  a 
disruptive  challenge  that  would  require  an  evolution  in  the  tactics  and  means  of  data 
protection regulation. Modernisation can take two directions: 1) on the one hand, measures 
that aim at strengthening individuals’ rights; 2) on the other hand, reinforcing requirements 
placed on data controllers and processors while removing excessive administrative burdens.  
6.2.1  Strengthening individuals’ data protection rights 
Much of the proposed modernisation addresses individual rights in the digital environment 
(European Commission, 2010c, p. 5; 2012, Recital 5). Not all proposals add up to regulatory 
innovation that could offer new responses to a technical paradigm shift.
55  
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  Clarification 
In parts, the legislative proposal clarifies and removes certain ambiguities: 
-  In the definition of consent, a statement or affirmative action is a prerequisite (European 
Commission, 2012a, Art. 4(8)); 
-  The nascent separation principle also clarifies that consent is not “freely” given where 
the data subject has no choice not to consent (European Commission, 2012a, Recitals 
32, 33). 
Neither proposal reforms the  law, but may out-law practices that relied on  interpretations 
according to which the consent mutates to a right to object (Kosta, 2013). While Task Force 
participants stress the need for flexibility and shared responsibilities, as well as the benefits of 
free  online  content  for  consumers,  pervasive  commercial  practices  essentially  place  the 
opportunity costs of managing privacy on individuals. 
Germany, and possibly the  new EU  framework,  foresees a  lighter  form of the  separation 
principle, which requires that the request for consent for additional data processing must be 
prominently  separated.  The  economic  evidence  would  also  support  measures  that  reverse 
dynamics in online transactions to the benefit of users and consumers (see section 3.3.4). 
Some Task Force participants cautioned that, as a result, a “privacy divide” can emerge where 
those  who  can  afford  privacy  enjoy  it.  However,  it  also  emerged  that  businesses  are 
specifically interested in this segment of the population that is happy to pay a premium for 
privacy. What other consequences of a separation principle would be, beyond the possible 
need  to  determine  what  is  a  fair  premium  for  privacy  (which  may  require  regulatory 
intervention), cannot be predicted. 
The regulatory treatment of consent in a situation of significant imbalance between the data 
subject and the controller is still very much in flux. Originally inferred as a safeguard in 
employment  relationships,  this  provisions  now  oscillates  between  dominant  firms  in  a 
consumer  relationship  and  other  situations  that  are  critical  for  free  decision-making,  e.g. 
individual insurances. Participants of the Task Force were particularly sensitive to expand the 
provision to dominant firms per se. Perhaps a clear separation principle under fair conditions 
would  suffice  to  address  the  concern  regarding  online  service,  be  they  free  or  for 
remuneration. 
  Extensions of existing rights 
Certain rights of the data subject in the draft proposal for a general data protection Regulation 
could be better perceived as extensions of existing rights: 
-  The right to be forgotten as an extension to the right of erasure (Art. 17) (Kuner, 2012a, 
p. 11); 68  IRION & LUCHETTA 
 
-  The right to data portability as a modern means to access one’s own personal data, but 
with the new edge to transfer it between providers (Art. 18). 
The right to be forgotten appears to be most controversial where the controller has made the 
personal data public, not the least because of the right to freedom of expression. Leaving the 
arguably legalistic exercise of balancing conflicting fundamental rights to the controller may 
potentially result “in a chilling effect on use of the Internet” (Kuner, 2012a, p. 11; see also 
FRA,  2012,  p.  15f.).
56  Beyond  clashing  fundamental  rights, the  right  to  be  forgotten  and 
erasure is designed as a best effort approach and requires the controller to inform third parties 
that are processing the personal data about the data subject’s request “to erase any links to, or 
copy or replication of that personal data” (Art. 17(2).  
  Regulatory innovation 
The rules on data portability and profiling are new to the fabric of personal data protection 
and can therefore be considered regulatory innovation (European Commission, 2012a, Arts 
18, 20).  
The right to data portability is a highly controversial issue, largely because it is not clear from 
the legislative proposal whether this is a ‘lex social network’ (European Commission, 2010c, 
pp. 7ff; see also De Hert & Papakonstantinou, 2012, p.138) or would concern every other 
context,  such  as  electricity  providers  and  banks.  The  feasibility  of  implementing  the 
portability of personal data and the extent to which this implies mandating electronic data 
exchange  formats  are  also  contested  points  (Art.  18(3)).  The  principle  of  portability  is, 
however,  capable  of  significantly  strengthening  individuals’  rights  where  personal 
information is compiled over time and could be transferred to a different provider (Costa & 
Poullet, 2012, p. 527; De Hert & Papakonstantinou, 2012, p.138). 
The concern about profiling, which  is  now within the reach of nearly every  controller of 
systematic personal data collections, is difficult to pin down. While the draft proposal for a 
general  data  protection  Regulation  appears  to  settle  for  regulating  measures  based  on 
profiling, a few Task Force contributors expressed caution about the very process of creating 
personal  profiles  (Leenes,  2013)  and  possibly  discrimination  and  indirect  processing  of 
sensitive  data  in  algorithms  (De  Hert  &  Papakonstantinou,  2012,  p.  138;  Korff,  2012).
57 
Several legitimate bases for profiling would be offered. However, the threshold for measures 
legitimately based on profiling is comparatively low and the interests of the data subject not 
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expression and freedom of expression in the draft proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation (Art. 80). 
57 See also the definition used by the Council of Europe (2010, at 1(e)) regarding profiling: “an automatic data 
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to  be  subject to  profiling  in  a  commercial  context,  except  where  explicitly  consented  to, 
would not be specifically protected.
58 
6.2.2  Updated requirements placed on data controllers 
The  reform  proposal  for  a  general  data  protection  Regulation  envisages  removing  some 
administrative burdens, but simultaneously introduces a range of new obligations that aim to 
enhance  systematic  compliance  with  data  protection  rules.  Because  abolishing  the 
dysfunctional notification requirement is well received by all stakeholders, new technical and 
organisational measures for controllers are reviewed below. 
  Data protection by design and by default 
The principles of data protection by design and by default have been fashioned for some time 
as a promising remedy for automated processing of personal data (see section 5.2.2; European 
Commission, 2012a, Art. 23(1) and (2)). 
Data  protection  by  design  is  an  umbrella  for  all  kinds  of  technical  and  organisational 
measures  that  the  controller  could  adopt  in  order  to  ensure  data  protection  rights  of 
individuals and compliance with relevant data protection legislation. It is a general principle 
that is sensitive to the state of the art and the cost of implementation of any such measures. It 
is flexible because it does not hold much prescriptive substance apart from requiring that 
privacy by design should be taken account of both at the time of the determination of the 
means for processing and at the time of the processing itself. The risk for this principle may 
consist  in the  lack of any  benchmarks against which good or bad practices are assessed. 
Indeed, the lack of a clear benchmark may prevent this principle from living up to its aim, 
beyond only requiring more documentation for controllers regarding their efforts to comply. 
Data  protection  by  default  seeks  to  harness  technical  means  to  give  effect  to  important 
principles of data quality, i.e. purpose specification, collection limitation, and use limitation 
(see  section  4.1.2;  European  Commission,  2012a,  Art.  23(2)).  “In  particular,  those 
mechanisms shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible to an indefinite 
number  of  individuals”  (Art.  23(2)).  As  a  technical  design  principle  adherence  to  this 
requirement could be relatively easy to verify.  
There is a good chance that the demand for technological solutions that deliver data protection 
by design and default could jumpstart a market for producers of devices and software. EU 
data protection regulation should be clear that controllers comply with data protection  by 
design and default if they use assured products and services of third parties, e.g. where they 
are certified under a data protection certification scheme. 
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There is an emerging view that from a societal and ethical point of view other central actors 
should  also  bear  some  responsibility  for  data  protection,  e.g.  those  who  design  technical 
specifications and those who actually build or implement applications or operating systems 
(European  Commission  2007b,  p.  2f.).  PETs  will  only  be  truly  beneficial  if  they  are 
effectively incorporated into and used by technical equipment and software tools that carry 
out processing of personal data (European Commission 2007b, p. 6). 
When looking at the implementation of privacy by design and by default as shown by the 
Proposal, it can be  questioned  whether it is sufficient to  only address controllers and 
processors, since there is a great relevance of these regulations for advisers, developers 
and producers of hardware and software as well. They should particularly be subject to 
the concept of privacy of design. It might be more efficient to attach this concept right at 
the source. (Traple Konarski Podrecki and Partners and European Legal Studies Institute, 
2012, p.51) 
Judged  from  the  present  draft,  EU  data  protection  regulation  fails  to  acknowledge  that 
individuals would also be empowered by PETs. Individuals should be free to install PETs on 
their personal devices. 
  Data protection impact assessment 
“Where  processing  operations  present  specific  risks  to  the  rights  and  freedoms  of  data 
subjects  by  virtue  of  their  nature,  their  scope,  and  their  purposes”  the  controller  (or  the 
processor on the controller’s behalf) has to carry out a data protection impact assessment” 
(European Commission, 2012a, Art. 33). A catalogue designates processing operations that 
would trigger this obligation, i.e. a) automated measures based on profiling that produce a 
significant legal effect for individuals, b) measures and decisions regarding individuals based 
on the processing of special categories of personal data relating to sex life, health, race and 
ethnic origin in health care and medical research, c) large-scale video surveillance in publicly 
accessible areas, d) personal data in large-scale filing systems on children, genetic data or 
biometric  data,  and  e)  processing  operations  for  which  prior  consultations  of  DPAs  is 
required. 
The processing operations listed raise high the bar for impact assessment; some would say too 
high to buttress privacy by design and by default. The impact assessment does not decide on 
the  legitimacy  of  the  purpose  of  the  intended  processing  operation  in  relation  to  the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subjects. Rather, it is a systematic exercise to 
describe  the  processing  operations,  identify  corresponding  risks  and  measures  that  would 
address these risks. Although representatives of data subjects should be involved, there is no 
transparency  requirement  concerning  the  impact  assessment  (“without  prejudice  to  the 
protection of commercial or public interests or the security of the processing operations”). A 
lack of transparency may actually hamper the accountability on which the data protection 
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  Data protection officers 
An important organisational measure is to require controllers and processors to designate a 
data protection officer (hereafter, DPO) if they are crossing a certain threshold (European 
Commission,  2012a,  Art.  35).  The  concept  of  DPOs  originates  in  Germany  as  an  early 
substitute of the notification requirement, and has taken root in many organisations elsewhere 
to  ensure  compliance  with  building  expertise  in-house  or  externally.  As  one  Task  Force 
contributor  observed,  for  larger  companies  DPOs  have  really  evolved  from  assuming  a 
clerical to a strategic function (Kuner, 2012b). 
DPOs  must  possess  the  necessary  professional  requirements.
59  Controllers  and  processors 
have  to  ensure  that  the  DPO  is  involved  in  any  decision  concerning  personal  data;  to 
guarantee his/her independence; and to provide the resources for his/her activities. DPOs have 
an advisory role and are involved in monitoring internal policies in relation to the protection 
of  personal  data  (and  namely  the  principles  of  data  protection  by  design,  default,  data 
security, handling of data subjects’ request, DPIA), have to maintain records and to fulfil 
notification and communication duties vis-à-vis the DPA. 
There appears to be no agreement on what is a meaningful threshold to determine which 
controllers  have  to  designate  a  DPO:  number  of  employees,  number  of  personal  data 
processed per year, or if an organisation’s core activity that concerns the systematic and large-
scale processing of personal data should be decisive. It is reasonable to rely on a composite 
threshold, because large organisations can be expected to invest in data protection expertise, 
while other, even significantly, smaller organisations, when they specialise in processing and 
transfer of personal data, should be required to designate a DPO. One additional exemption 
should  be  considered  when  and  insofar  as  personal  data  processing  is  necessary  for  the 
performance of a contract to which the data subject is party (see section 6.3.3.) 
If well attuned, DPOs can indeed be a meaningful way to infuse data protection expertise in 
organisations  that  are  significant  controllers  and  processors  of  personal  data.  However, 
according to the impact assessment, DPOs are the single most burdensome addition to the 
privacy legal framework, creating administrative costs for €320 million if rolled out across 
Europe (European Commission, 2012b, p.69). As a way to better balance this burden, private 
organisations can rely on external DPOs that devote a fraction of their time, or designate an 
internal employee to take on this role together with other responsibilities. 
6.2.3  Accountability and administrative burden to demonstrate compliance 
Accountability, which is not a new concept in data protection (WP29, 2010c) is going to 
become  the  central  bedrock  of  personal  data  protection  regulation.  The  notion  of 
accountability or responsibility is not defined as it perhaps should be, e.g. as “a permanent 
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and dynamic compliance process” of a controller that would align  internal processes and 
policies  with  data  protection  requirements  (Falque-Pierrotin,  2012,  p.7).  A  Task  Force 
contributor  pointed  out  that  accountability  would  be  best  served  by  relating  closely  to 
established corporate governance mechanisms, such as mandatory annual corporate filings 
and (voluntary) corporate social responsibilities (Kuner, 2012a, p. 12; 2012b; see also WEF, 
2012, p. 21). 
Under the draft proposal for a general data protection Regulation it is the responsibility of the 
controller  to  ensure  adherence  to  data  protection  Regulation  and  to  demonstrate  this 
compliance  on  request  (Arts  5(f)  and  22).  It  therefore  links  to  a  number  of  specific 
responsibilities,  of  which  the  documentation  requirement  has  caused  most  controversy  as 
creating additional administrative burdens for businesses (Art. 28). Thus, “[t]he commendable 
reduction of bureaucracy in some areas is at least partially offset by the introduction of other 
procedural requirements (Kuner, 2012a, p. 26).  
There  is,  however,  little  alternative  to  internal  documentation  if  a  controller  wants  to  be 
informed and up-to-date about processing operations under its control, not least with a view to 
ensuring compliance. It is important to recognise that documentation duties are inherently 
commensurate with the intensity of processing operations. They can be fairly simple for those 
private  organisations  whose  main  operations  are  not  concerned  with  data  processing 
operations.  Prospectively,  a  large  share  of  the  required  documentation  of  data  processing 
operations could be automatised, e.g. logging data categories, rules, and routines.
60 The new 
Regulation should be specific about the possibility to comply with documentation duties at 
the level of IT systems and management. 
It seems that the documentation duties would become subject to some threshold likely to 
converge with the DPO requirement. It is a difficult trade-off to reduce administrative burden 
for SMEs and nonetheless instil in them accountability for data protection. It may be better 
not to exempt SMEs wholesale from documentation duties but instead to privilege personal 
data processing when and insofar as is necessary for the performance of a contract to which 
the data subject is party (see section 6.3.3.). However, there should be schemes in particular 
for  SMEs  (perhaps  with  variations  per  industry  or  sector)  that  would  enable  EU-wide 
compliance and grant legal certainty (see also Kuner, 2012b). 
6.2.4  Negative regulatory incentives 
Negative regulatory incentives are very common in a command-and-control type of regulation 
where they  are used as a deterrent against defection  from the  law (Baldwin  et al., 2012, 
p.249).  EU  data  protection  regulation  does  already  hold  the  possibility  to  impose 
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administrative and criminal sanctions as well as civil law liabilities but member states often 
rely on soft enforcement (see section 3.2.2).  
If adopted, the general data protection Regulation would introduce significant sanctions for 
violating privacy obligations that can reach 2% of company revenues (Art. 79); however, 
sanctions would need to be commensurate with the wrongdoing or misdemeanour at stake. 
Although the ceiling is five times lower than for violations of EU competition law, monetary 
sanctions “are for the first time in the history of data protection law, of such a magnitude that 
they will get attention from companies’ CEOs and general counsel” (Kuner, 2012a, p.21). 
This would give more teeth to enforcement and potential deterrence. 
As it stands, administrative sanctions are very much geared towards fines, however, DPAs 
should be able to take into account voluntary commitments by controllers when imposing a 
fine, e.g. submitting to an independent data protection audit. Other enforcement actions may 
be necessary to assist compliance and rectify non-compliance, e.g. reinstating the requirement 
to designate a DPO in the case of exempted organisations. 
Another negative incentive is the data breach notification that made its trajectory from the e-
privacy Directive into the draft proposal for a general data protection Regulation (Arts 31 and 
32). In combination with corporate efforts to protect their brand’s reputation the data breach 
notification could harness controllers’ best practices to protect the security of personal data. 
There are many benefits associated with a personal data breach notification duty because it 
enhances transparency and actionability in such events of DPAs and individuals.  
6.3  Unresolved critical issues 
Aside from the detailed wording that is still being negotiated in the legislative process, what 
critical issues did the reform proposals for a general data protection Regulation not address? 
In  short,  the  Regulation  remains  too  complex,  regulatory  concepts  lack  scalability  and 
positive regulatory incentives. 
6.3.1  Complexity 
If  simplification  and  clarification were  a  declared  aim  of  the  data  protection  reform,  the 
proposals do not attain it (European Commission, 2010b, p. 18; Parliament, 2011, para. 25). 
On the contrary, the law is becoming more and more complex (Kuner, 2012a, p.5 and p.26).
61 
Data protection regulation will undermine its own raison d’etre if it is not conceived from the 
perspective of regulatees and their varying expertise. Arguably, other legislation is highly 
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specialised too but often it is not meant to be complied with by virtually every company and 
business that processes personal data. 
What is needed is a decisive effort to draft a document that uses plain language and a more 
accessible structure (e.g. introducing different tiers of obligations relative to the intensity and 
sophistication  of  making  use  of  personal  information).  The  basic  tiers  of  data  protection 
regulation must be capable of being understood and complied with by individuals who are 
themselves data controllers/processors or work for one, regardless of an organisation’s size 
(see section 6.3.3 on personal data processing in the context of the performance of a contract 
to which the data subject is party). Required expertise in compliance management can be 
scaled up whenever the processing of personal data intensifies and more risks for the data 
subjects are involved. This logic is already present in data protection Regulation but it does 
not come across easily from the text. 
6.3.2  Scalability 
The reform proposals have been criticised for applying linear data protection concepts to a 
world  of  ubiquitous  and  distributed  personal  data  processing.  In  spite  of  many  welcome 
updates  and  regulatory  innovation  in  the  detail,  the  reform  proposal  appears  to  be  path-
dependent to an extent that it favours disaggregated management of personal data protection 
on the part of the companies and individuals concerned. What is missing are new concepts 
that would scale protection adequately in the information-rich future (Traung, 2012, p.47). 
There are a few ideas, such as encouraging the development of data protection certification 
mechanisms and of data protection seals and marks. However, in order to meet the scale and 
magnitude  of  online  personal  data  processing  regulatory  intervention  points  should  be 
selected that are scalable (see section 4.2.3). Standardisation and PETs in middleware should 
become more central to the regulatory strategy. Moreover, the draft Regulation’s reading of 
PETs  is  almost  exclusively  geared  to  controllers  and  processors  rather  than  empowering 
individuals and users. 
6.3.3  Positive regulatory incentives 
We should be concerned that the draft proposal for a general data protection Regulation has 
so little capacity to nudge desired behaviour via positive regulatory incentives. Task Force 
participants did not identify any direct positive incentives either, and now policy-makers are 
still searching. However, the search for positive incentives should not conclude with carving 
out segments from personal data protection altogether but regulatory incentives should reward 
compliance from within the systematic of data protection. 
Conceptually, data protection offers a few leverage points that could or should be used to 
instigate data protection compliant strategies on behalf of businesses: 1) use of anonymisation 
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which the data subject is party, and 3) purposefully promoting the uptake of privacy by design 
and by default. 
  Anonymisation techniques 
Using data rendered anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable 
does  not  fall  under  the  scope  of  application  of  the  EU  regulatory  framework  on  data 
protection (see European Commission, 2012a, recital 23). What could be a powerful incentive 
to use anonymisation techniques (Kuner, 2012, p. 9) may not receive widespread commercial 
support in an environment in which personal data is widely considered a commercial asset. 
Considering that data processing can be a mix and match strategy, for some purposes personal 
data would be used while other purposes can be achieved with anonymised data, with the 
advantage that the latter case does not incur any administrative burden. A public knowledge 
base  of  common  issues  and  descriptions  of  how  they  can  be  addressed  by  relying  on 
anonymised data could help raise awareness and promote this strategy. 
  E-commerce and the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party 
Personal data processing in the context of the performance of a contract to which the data 
subject is party should be better framed as a baseline situation, which should ideally incur 
only  the  minimum  of  administrative  burden.  EU  data  protection  regulation  recognises 
processing of personal data where and insofar as this is necessary for the performance of a 
contract to which the data subject is party as a legitimate ground for data processing (data 
protection Directive, Art. 7(b)). MSMEs and larger enterprises would benefit within the scope 
of this legitimate basis for personal data processing and exemptions from legal obligations 
could  be  justified,  e.g.  no  DPO  would  be  required  and  there  would  be  no  further 
documentation duties.
62 Perhaps this baseline scenario should be updated to fit e-commerce 
and  online  service  better,  in  particular  clarifying  that  it  would  also  comprise  the 
personalisation of services. What could work as a positive regulatory incentive in the realm of 
data protection in e-commerce would incidentally also serve the EU flagship initiative ‘A 
Digital Agenda for Europe’ (European Commission, 2012b, p. 12) to build digital confidence. 
  Promoting the uptake of privacy by design and default 
Positive regulatory incentives to promote the uptake of privacy by design and default are still 
sought (Traple Konarski Podrecki and Partners and European Legal Studies Institute, 2012, 
p.28). It is important to bear in mind that pseudonymisation of personal data could be an 
important ingredient of privacy by design and default but it does not equal this approach, 
which would require additional technical and organisational measures. One possibility is to 
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privilege the use of data protection compliant technologies by controllers in a way that would 
stimulate the demand for such products. One possibility would be to recognise off-the-shelf 
compliance for those parts of data processing equipment and software that are independently 
audited or certified as privacy by design and default, and then sold or licensed to controllers. 
Another known strategy is leveraging public procurement at EU and member state level to 
express preferences for data protection audited or certified products and PETs (see European 
Commission, 2007b, p.12). 
By  way  of  summarising  this  section,  the  draft  proposal  for  a  general  data  protection 
Regulation  offers  substantial  advantages  compared  to the  present  situation.  However,  the 
regulatory ‘one-stop-shop’ is still in legal limbo and from the vantage point of online personal 
data processing fragmentation persists along the lines of the e-privacy Directive and diverse 
EU/national legislation that mandate processing operations. Any modernisation is rather in the 
detail and evolutionary but overall the proposal remains complex and lacks scalability and 
substantial  positive  regulatory  incentives  that  would  nudge  desired  behaviours  from 
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Conclusions with policy recommendations 
There is a wide consensus that the first-generation data protection rules of 1995 are in need of 
an update. The ongoing legislative reform aims to fully harmonise and modernise EU data 
protection regulation on the basis of the existing data protection acquis. Many commentators 
define digital confidence and trust as a key enabler of the new information-rich economy. EU 
data protection regulation has a role to play in the enhancement of that confidence and trust.  
It is one of the most ambitious legislative objectives to engage EU policy-makers currently. 
Various legal traditions and cultures meet in the EU and individual perceptions about privacy 
and  data  protection  tend  to  vary  among  member  states  (European  Commission,  2011). 
Nonetheless,  both,  privacy  and  data  protection  form  part  of  the  common  constitutional 
heritage of EU member states. 
As a policy issue data protection understandably tends to be quite polarised (RAND, 2011, 
p.46). EU policy-makers  find themselves  in the unenviable position of  having to strike  a 
balance  between  the  different  interests  at  stake  to  satisfy  European  fundamental  rights, 
without off-setting what the emerging information-rich economy has to offer for consumers, 
businesses and society at large. 
Issuing policy recommendations at a time when the second-generation EU data protection 
legislation is in progress in the EU legislative process runs the risk of being judged against the 
politics of the moment; its scope is more ambitious than informing this ongoing legislative 
process, however. 
Against  the  background  of  online  personal  data  processing,  this  report  issues  policy 
recommendations that would address short- and medium-term policy goals that advocate a 
meta-governance approach to privacy and data protection. 
Policy recommendations  
Data protection  in the EU translates the protection of  fundamental rights  into sui generis 
rules. As it is proposed, the general data protection Regulation applies horizontally for most 
public and private processing of personal data.
63 
1.  In  scope,  the  new  regulation  is  technologically  neutral,  however,  the  regulatory 
division of  labour with  national  legislation pursuant to the e-privacy Directive and 
potentially other legislations needs to be further clarified (see section 6.1.2). Task Force 
participants stressed that the relation between the general regulation and the e-privacy 
Directive should be addressed during the ongoing legislative process. 
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2.  From the vantage point of online personal data processing, fragmentation persists along 
the  lines  of  the  e-privacy  Directive.  EU  data  protection  rules  that  apply  to  all 
information society and value added services online should be consolidated and thereby 
unified within the regulation (see section 6.1.2). 
3.  Strengthening the tenets of risk-based regulation, information assurance and 
management, as well as consumer protection within data protection is a plausible 
strategy in response to the privacy and data protection challenges of the digital 
environment. 
4.  The regulation should be further consolidated with the aim to obtain a single and clear 
policy. The draft legislation should be edited, use plain language, and reduce implicit 
concepts which really matter, e.g. transfer of personal data to third parties (see sections 
3.2.2, 4.2.2 and 6.3.1). 
In addition, the regulation to come should pay attention to further concrete short-term policy 
recommendations: 
1.  Resolve  The  legal  treatment  of  online  identifiers  so  that  it  remains  internally 
consistent with other provisions (see section 4.1). 
2.  Ensure consistency in the event that the definitions of controllers and processors are 
adjusted and retain a responsibility for the means of data processing. Introduce a rule 
that consumers cannot be the controllers of their personal information that reside in 
third party equipment under a non-negotiable agreement with the service provider (see 
section 4.1.3.). 
3.  Strengthen  individuals’  consent  as  the  lynchpin  for  quasi  market  mechanisms  in 
personal data transactions with a clear separation principle that prevents the bundling 
of  online  services  with  individuals’  consent  to  unrelated  additional  personal  data 
processing. (see sections 3.3.4, 4.1.4 and 4.2.1). 
4.  The ‘legitimate interest’ as a legitimate basis for the processing of personal data needs 
further  clarification  and  defined  boundaries  in  order  to  offer  legal  certainty  to 
controllers and individuals alike (see section 4.2.2). 
5.  In exercising the new ‘right to be forgotten’ controllers should not be left in charge to 
balance  conflicting  fundamental  rights,  i.e.  the  right  to  privacy  with  the  right  to 
freedom of expression, without further guidance (see section 6.2.1). 
6.  The scope of the new right to data portability should be clarified and, where it is not 
otherwise legally permitted, profiling is a distinct purpose to which the data subject 
has to consent to (see section 6.2.1). 
7.  Regulation should enable technologically mediated compliance, e.g. complying with 
documentation duties through automated IT compliance systems; automated means of 
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8.  Positive  regulatory  incentives  should  be  strengthened  to  be  consistent  with  the 
Regulation, using as leverage points: 
a.  the  processing  of  personal  data  where  and  insofar  as  this  is  necessary  for  the 
performance of a contract to which the data subject is party, which should ideally 
incur only the minimum of administrative burden (see section 6.3.3); 
b.  privilege the use of data protection compliant technologies by controllers and 
recognise off-the-shelf compliance for those parts of data processing equipment and 
software, which are sold or licensed to controllers (see section 6.3.3); 
c.  enable  EU-wide  compliance  schemes,  in  particular  for  SMEs,  (perhaps  with 
variations per industry or sector) and grant legal certainty (see section 6.2.3) as well 
as clarify the role of codes of conduct in complying with data protection Regulation 
(see section 5.2.1). 
9.  The  one-stop-shop  premise  must  be  fully  accomplished  without  depriving  mutual 
assistance and joint operations of national DPAs. The consistency mechanism needs 
more  consolidation  so  as  not to  exceed  its  capacity  or  inflate  the  decision-making 
back-end (see section 6.1.1). 
10.  As a transparency measure member states shall be asked to draw up a public repository 
of legal data processing obligations to which the controller  is subject (see section 
6.1.2). 
11.  Regarding  sanctions,  DPAs  should  be  able  to  take  into  account  commitments  by 
controllers when imposing a fine. If SMEs are exempted from certain data protection 
requirements, instead of or complimentary to a fine, reinstituting the requirements to 
designate a DPO and documentation duties is a tactical remedy. 
12. As a transparency measure, member states shall be asked to draw up a public repository 
of legal data processing obligations to which the controller is subject. 
Mid-term policy recommendations which aim to strengthen data protection as a field of public 
policy are addressed to the EU and the member states: 
1.  Fostering a culture of privacy and data protection should be firmly embedded in a 
meta-governance approach where member states and the EU co-operate at all levels 
and ensure through a variety of measures the optimal attainment of both objectives.  
a.  In consultation with member states, the EU should adopt a comprehensive strategy 
that addresses all participants in the public and the private sector according to their 
respective roles and responsibilities. 
b.  Data protection legislation is bound to become the centre-piece of the EU policy but 
its values should be reinforced at various levels and via other measures spanning 
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c.  Cultural impulses are indispensible to promote the values of privacy and data 
protection in the EU and beyond. Measures have to target data subjects, controllers, 
processors  and  professional  groups  equally  and  should,  wherever  possible,  be 
integrated with other policy fields at EU and member state level (see section 5.2.3). 
2.  Measures to protect privacy and data protection must be scalable in order to retain their 
effectiveness in the information-rich economy (see sections 4.2.3 and 6.3.2). 
a.  Standardisation and PETs in middleware should become more central in the 
regulatory strategy (see section 5.2). 
b.  EU-wide certification and compliance schemes that grant legal certainty need to 
be prioritized. 
c.  Policy should recognise the role of PETS for empowering individuals and the 
ability to exercise control over personal data via connected consumer devices (see 
sections 4.2.3 and 5.2.2). 
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